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Since 1964 the Fedayeen organizations have become a major factor
in the politics of the Middle East. These groups have not only been the
source of disagreements and discussions between Israel, the Arab states,
other nations, and the United Nations but also they have been the source
of conflict within the separate states. The purpose of this thesis is to
give some proposals or conditions by which the United States may recog-
nize the Palestine Liberation Organization as a separate entity. In order
to provide valid proposals, the emphasis of the study will be on the PLO,
the Fedayeen, their organization and positions, and the United States'
positions on this subject. Concerning the latter, the position of Israel is
included because of the historical ties between the two nations. The
thesis is divided into four major areas: the rise of the Fedayeen and its
current place in international politics; the organization of the PLO and
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PREFACE
The word Palestine is of Roman origin, referring to the Biblical
land of the Philistines. For centuries the name fell into disuse until it
was revived by the British as an official title for an area mandated to
their control by the League of Nations after the breakup of the Turkish
Ottoman Empire in World War I. The British mandate also applied to
Trans- Jordan, although it did not lie within the area designated
'Palestine. '
Because the mandate applied to both regions there is the argument
that the word Palestinian applies to persons east as well as west of the
Jordan River. There is also the further argument that the word applies
not just to Arabs but also to Jews and Christians who live in the former
mandated area.
The United States has recently re-oriented its thinking of international
affairs from Southeast Asia to the continuing conflict in the Middle East.
The United States, its allies, and its opponents are closely watching the
developments of the peace efforts, the preparations for war, and the role
of the Palestinians in this area.
The objective of this thesis is to identify the possible conditions in
which the United States may recognize the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion as a separate entity in world politics. To achieve this, the thesis is
divided into four phases. The first describes the Fedayeen movement as

a group, particularly the objectives, backgrounds, and accomplishments
of each major organization. The second gives a limited description of
the organization of the PLO and the major Fedayeen groups. The third
phase gives a description of the positions the United States has taken,
principally since 1967. The fourth phase gives three proposals which
may end the conflict concerning the Palestinians.
Because of the voluminous material written on the Palestinians,
this thesis must, by necessity, narrow its subject. In describing the
decisive aspects of the Fedayeen, this thesis will not give a complete
history of the PLO or the Fedayeen organizations nor will it describe
every Palestinian group. For the sake of simplicity, the discussion of
the Fedayeen will concentrate on the PLO, Fatah, and the groups which
comprise the 'rejection front. ' The names Fatah and the Palestine
Liberation Organization will often be interchanged since Fatah is the
controlling element in the PLO. Examination of the Fedayeen will be
restricted mainly to the time frame of 1964 to the present and will not
give a detailed analysis of the conflicts between the Fedayeen, Israel,
and the Arab states.
Narrowing the subject in this manner does not mean this thesis will
operate in a vacuum. However, it does define the principle concern
of this thesis. To gain an individual in-depth knowledge of these groups
and the different nations' positions, the student of this subject should




The sources of data for this study have been primarily from recent
books and current newspapers and magazine articles from the United
States, Israel, Great Britain, and translations of Arab and foreign
sources. I am deeply indebted to Dr. John Amos of the National Security
Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, for providing an insight
and information on this subject.
This paper does not attempt to be one of historical summary or one
of reinterpretation, but it endeavors to relate what happened yesterday,
what is happening today, and what might happen tomorrow. The issue of
the Palestinians is real, and no actor in or observer of the international
political arena can ignore them.

I. FEDAYEEN
Any understanding of the Palestine Liberation Organization must
include a perception of the fedayeen groups which have given rise to
militant Palestinian nationalism. Since the time of the British Mandate,
the Palestinians reacted against control of what they considered their
nation. Although there have been increases and declines in the popularity
of this movement, it has constantly been advocated by both Palestinians
and Arabs. Following the Israeli victory in the 1948 Palestine war, the
agony of defeat and the dispersion of the Palestinian people to several
nations caused a considerable decline in enthusiasm for the cause. The
Arab nations have attempted to incorporate the Palestinian question in
their own causes for their advantage, and this strategy caused a further
decline in Palestinian nationalism.
Following the end of World War I, the Jews, through the World
Zionist Organization, began to work for the realization of the Jewish
National Home. The British further complicated the problem by giving
this group official recognition. Events began to build up between the
aspirations of the Jewish community and those of the Palestinians.
Until 1929 the Arab leaders attempted to design an accord, based on
legal means. The focal point of this time period was religious dif-
ferences as the Palestinians, Arabs, and Jews maneuvered to gain what
10

each group considered their respective Holy places. Muslims through-
out the Arab world were called on to assist the Palestine Arabs in pre-
serving Islam's holy places in Jerusalem. This policy came into con-
flict with the Jews' desire to pray at the Western Wall which surrounded
the Mosque compound. The result was an outbreak of riots in August
1929.
The 1929 riots marked the radicalization of the Palestinian struggle
against Jewish ideology. Following the riots, there was a change in
leadership in the person of al-Hajj Amin el-Hussaini. This new leader
found support from among a group of young radicals who proposed that
Zionism and the British be opposed by violent means. This Palestine
ultraism during the 1930s became a part of what was happening in the
rest of the Arab world as it approached independence. The event which
was in contrast to this latter development was the establishment of the
Jewish National Home and its gain in momentum. By 1939, the Jewish
community in Palestine numbered 30 percent of the country's entire
population -- about 450, 000.
In 1936 the Palestinians began a series of protests, demonstrations,
strikes, and moves against the British forces in the country. The
British forces were unable to contain this popular uprising, and they
asked the pro-British Arab rulers to use their influence to prevent the
Curtis, M.
,
and others, The Palestinians, People. History,
Politics, p. 124, Transaction Books, 1975.
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spread of the movement. For a time, there was a quiet in the area;
however, during the late 1930s Palestinian activities continued on a
random basis. The years of World War II saw a decline in the resist-
ance, but the peace in 1945 witnessed the beginning of new developments
in the struggle between the Jews and the Palestinians.
In May 1948 the state of Israel was established, and a great number
of Palestinians were dispersed to refugee camps. The first reaction of
the Palestinians was to resist any kind of rapprochement that would lead
to a final settlement with the state of Israel. Small Palestinian groups
residing in the Gaza Strip, Syria, and the West Bank took the initiative
by undertaking commando action inside Israel. These raids prompted
Israel to retaliate by carrying out raids into these territories. The
Palestinians were not based on, or connected to, any political group,
2but were trained and led by Egyptian Army officers.
The Palestinian groups which were politically active considered the
Arab governments as responsible for the defeat in 1948. As a result,
these groups became affiliated to, and politically active in, national
Arab parties such as the Ba'th and the Arab Nationalist Movement.
These groups appealed to the Palestinians since they called for Arab








state which would be capable of confronting Israel and liberating
Palestine.
On the other hand, the Arabs, in the 1950s, were apprehensive
about the inactivity which permeated the Palestinian problem, and they
believed that the people themselves would forget the cause and accept
its erosion. They believed that Israel would gain strength and would
be accepted by the outside world. When this occurred, the Arabs
believed, the Palestinians would accept their fate and would incorporate
themselves into Arab countries. To counter this trend, the Arabs pres-
sed a publicity campaign to keep the issue alive. An earlier Jordanian
Government booklet stated:
The theme for the Palestinian problem is of the gravest
consequence for the future of all Arabs is constantly
stressed in Arab publications. Never before have the
Arabs been so starkly exposed to danger.
The Arab League in their meeting of 30 August I960 concluded that all
Arab states should preserve the Palestinian entity and should avoid
whatever might bring its assimilation.
The inter- Arab rivalries have caused a basic dilemma in that the
issue became more tangled with each camp attempting to gain supremacy
for the Palestinian cause. Often, these rivalries have existed outside
the Arab-Israeli question. Nevertheless, the importance of the
3 Harkabi, Y.
,
Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy




Palestinian question has grown in recent years, so much that many
4
Arabs began to call it a 'War of National Liberation. '
The Palestinians themselves viewed their difficulties outside the
realm of the inter-Arab rivalries. After the 1948 debacle, the Pales-
tinians found themselves huddled in refugee camps with no methods to
exploit their nationalism. They found themselves as pawns as the
Arab states used them to gain position and status over each other. Arab
nations would not allow them to form a Palestine government-in-exile.
Instead, the Arab states were interested in annexing or occupying parts
of Palestine or in preventing other Arab states from doing so. In the
refugee camps the Palestinians found themselves leaderless and without
a sense of hope. King Abdullah of Jordan refused to comply with the
United Nations' partition recommendations which called for the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state in the Arab part of the former mandate;
this refusal established the ensuing conflict as an Arab- Israeli conflict
with the Palestinians relegated to the role of non- entities. The Arab
states considered them as lowly aliens in the states of their 'brethren'
with only Jordan extending them the right of citizenship.
This complete sense of frustration, the dream of imminent return








money led many of the young Palestinians into che hands of emerging
guerrilla organizations. These frustrations and desires on the part of
the Palestinians gave rise to terrorist raids into Israel from Arab states,
with the Palestinians becoming known for their tradition of terror and
raiding parties. Not all the raiders were Palestinians nor were they
true guerrillas in the mold of the Viet Cong, dedicated to a clear political
5
objective. As a rule, the raiders were committing criminal raids into
Israel, or they were being used by the Arab states for vaguely defined
motives.
In 1963 the Arab states learned of Israel's intentions of diverting
waters from the River Jordan and its tributaries to the Negev in south-
ern Israel. These waters were a constant source of Arab-Israeli debate
since Israel needed the water and the Arabs refused to share any from
their resources. In 1964 at an Arab summit, chaired by President Nasir,
the Arabs failed to come to a conclusion about what should be done con-
cerning the Israeli project. Syria advocated open war with Israel, a
policy which was an extreme risk for Nasir and King Hussein of Jordan.
Hussein stood to lose his territory west of the Jordan and possibly his
throne while Nasir would face the loss of prestige.
5 0'Ballance, E.
,






The Arab Cold War 1958-1970, p. 98, RIIA, 1971,
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In July 1964 Israel completed the water project, and in the same
month, the PLO came into being under Egyptian sponsorship. Nasir
chose Ahmed Shukairy, a Palestinian Arab, to head the new organization.
The choice was obvious for Nasir since Shukairy had always loudly
advocated the Palestinian cause and was considered a safe Nasirite.
Nasir would still not allow a government-in- exile but he did allow
Shukairy to recruit Palestinian refugees to form the Palestine Liberation
Army (PLA). The purpose of the PLA was to be the vanguard for the
liberation of the usurped parts of Palestine. The aim of the PLA was to
harass the Israelis with constant fedayeen raids, a task for which it was
trained on the lines of the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN),
7
a popular organization in revolutionary circles. Both Hussein and
Nasir recognized that the PLO and PLA would delay a confrontation with
Israel and that Nasir would insure they would be held to this purpose.
Syria still advocated strikes against Israel but received no support from
Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon who feared reprisals from Israel. To
counter this, Syria assumed sponsorship of the Fatah and its military
8
arm, Asifah.
7 O'Ballance, op. cit.
, p. 23.
Q
Dodd, C. H. ar.d Sales, M. E. , Israel and the Arab World
, p. 22,





A. THE EMERGENCE OF FATAH
The terms fedayeen and Fatah have meanings of a historical nature.
Fedayeen is a common Arab term for Arab irregulars acting against
Israel. The word is from the root sacrifice, that is those who sacrifice
themselves or assume a suicidal mission. Historically, the name was
used in the twelfth century by those who were selected to assassinate
the enemies of the Isma'ili sect (the Assassins). Fatah's full title is
"Tahir al Hatani al Falestini, " the Movement for the National Liberation
of Palestine. The initials HTF form the Arabic word for death and when
reversed to FTH, form the Arabic word for conquest. The word Asifah
means 'the storm. '
The first elements of Fatah were formed in the 195 0s in Germany
9by Yasir Mohammad Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir and Salah Khalaf. All of
these men were Palestinian students and they looked to the FLN, then
fighting the French in Algiers, for inspiration and guidance. The Fatah
core group later expanded to include Faruq al-Qaddumi, Muhammed
10
Yusif an-Najjar, Kamal Adqan, and Khalid al-Hassan. The core of
Fatah ideology was that all inter-Arab issues were secondary to the main
challenge which was the liberation of Palestine. Fatah's initial recruiting
and training activities were first based in Algeria and Kuwait. In 1964
9Later known as: Arafat=Abu Ammar; Khalaf=Abu Ayad; al-Wazir =
Abu Jihad.




Fatah decided to move on the offensive against Israel. Fatah' s belief
that the 1948 defeat was accepted by the Arab states and the senior
Palestinian leaders was rooted in a deep distrust of these leaders which
was a factor in its search for a suitable base from which it could launch
its attacks. It chose Syria which was an outcast from the Arab states
since its withdrawal from the United Arab Republic. Syria, wishing to
prove that the Ba'thist Party was the real leader of the Arab people,
allowed Fatah to establish itself in its territory. Both Fatah and the
Syrian government believed that time was working against and not for
the Arabs. At this point, Fatah created its military arm, Asifa. Since
this time, the names Fatah and Asifah have become synonymous. Initial
recruitment for Asifah was slow since the Palestinians did not immediately
rise to the cause. To overcome this recruitment difficulty, Asifah had to
rely on individuals who were devoid of ideology and motivation. The
initial raid was set for 31 December 1964 when four small groups were to
stage from Lebanon to strike at four Israeli targets. The Lebanese
government discovered the operation and prevented its initiation. Fatah
reset its target date for 1 January 1965.
Four main stimuli attributed to the surfacing of Fatah as an open
fedayeen organization: the Israeli raid on Gaza; Nasir's coining the
term "Palestine entity"; the Algerian victory by the FLN and Nasir's
Yaari, E.
,




decline; and the feelings in the Arab world concerning Israel's complet-
ing the National Water Carrier Project. Fatah initiated its first raid
into Israel from Jordan when it struck the national water carrier near
a small Israeli village. The initial strike was a success and the guer-
rillas returned to their sanctuary. To prevent reprisal raids on its
territory, Syria insisted that Fatah not conduct its raids from Syrian
territory. By launching its raids from Jordan, in cooperation with
Syria's wishes, Fatah began to feel more of the hostility from the
Jordanian government. When Israel retaliated against the Fatah camps
in Jordan, Fatah found that access from this territory was becoming
more difficult. At this time Fatah began to operate from Syrian territory,
12
particularly the Gaza Strip. Fatah kept itself separate from other
PLO organizations during these forays into Israeli territory. The reason
for this aloofness was that Fatah believed the PLO was ineffective because
of its dependence on Arab governments for backing and inputs for the
fedayeen cause. The Fatah doctrine remained that its members should
give up all other affiliations and that Fatah should remain outside all
inter- Arab disputes. The basic philosophy remained --to liberate
Palestine.
Raids continued into Israel from Jordan and Syria; however, Israeli
reprisal actions were causing increased difficulty in mounting successful
^Kosut, H.
,
Israel St the Arabs: The June 1967 War





attacks by Fatah. On 1 June 1965 Fatah groups crossed from Lebanon
for the first time to conduct its raids against Israel. Although the raid-
ing parties did not inflict great damage, the Fatah groups did keep ten-
sions high and they did provoke retaliation. This one characteristic of
retaliation posed great problems for both Lebanon and Jordan, and Fatah
found itself averting not only the Israeli troops but also the troops from
these two countries. Even with these reprisals Fatah found that its
popularity was increasing and that more Palestinians were joining the
cause. In 1966, Fatah gained new support after a Syrian coup when the
new government decided to give the fedayeen group more support and to
allow more freedom of movement. The ultimate aim of the Syrian
government was to embroil Jodan and Lebanon in conflict with Israeli
troops. This goal was somewhat realized when Israeli and Jordanian
13troops met on 13 November 1966. From this time until June 1967,
activity on the Syrian- Israeli demilitarized zone was characterized by
incidents ranging from small arms fire to artillery and air bombardment.
To Fatah's delight, an Arab-Is raeli war seemed imminent, and the con-
flict, for which Fatah was responsible more than any other group,
suddenly erupted. Fatah had calculated that the Arabs would win; how-
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Fatah had achieved one of its goals, inciting war between the Arabs
and Israelis. Fatah' s raids into Israel caused Israeli reactions which
led to the conflict, although Nasir had warned that the Arab world was
not ready for any major action against the forces of Israel. The Six
Day War was a disaster for the Arab nations; the war left not only the
Arab regimes and people numbed and astonished but also the fedayeen
groups dispersed and in disarray. This was a war in which neither the
Arab masses or Fatah were involved. The most discredited agencies
were the PLO and PLA which were ineffective in the conflict. During
the war the PLA units which were in Syria and Egypt were incorporated
into the regular armies of those nations. They had not taken any action
on their own, and the leaders were fighting among themselves as to
what their objectives should be. Toward the end of the year, Shukairy
and most of his nominees were ousted from the leadership of the PLO.
The PLA remained splintered and remained ineffective; the members
found themselves being dominated by rival Arab governments.
B. POST-JUNE 1967
For awhile, the shock of defeat immobilized Fatah, but it soon
realized that new areas with large Arab populations came under Israeli
control. Fatah reasoned that its hour had come, that the time was ripe
to apply the dogma of modern guerrilla warfare -- that of mobilizing
the masses in the Vieg Cong manner to disrupt the government's
21

functioning by civil resistance and by using the masses as a source of
recTuits, intelligence, and supply. The pre-June policy of provoking
open war by escalation ceased; instead of using commando raids, Fatah
was to infiltrate into the occupied territories and carry out subversive
warfare in the Viet Cong style. By August 1967 Fatah was ready to
act. It had stored caches of arms and had organized and trained new
guerrilla groups. Fatah began increasing the number of subversive
incidents which caused the Israelis to mount a security offensive to
discover and disband the guerrilla units. Through captured Jordanian
intelligence and police documents, the Israelis were able to detect and
detain many agents as they crossed to the West Bank. By the end of
1967, the guerrilla network, for all practical purposes, was destroyed
by Israeli actions which killed, captured, and jailed the Fatah members.
By the end of the year, new fedayeen groups emerged to rival Fatah
and the PLO. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
under the leadership of Dr. George Habash, became the chief rival of
Arafat and Fatah. The PFLP came from a coalition of groups which
had been active prior to the Six Day War. During the 1950s a group of
Palestine intellectuals at the American University of Beirut became
involved in the Arab Nationalist Movement which stressed the primacy




Age of the Guerrilla, p. 72, Avon Books, 1968.
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liberation of Palestine. These students formed the ANM around the
leadership of Nabash, but the movement remained weak and decentral-
ized with small regional groups organized in several parts of the Arab
world. By August 1967, the Palestinian branch of the ANM, the
Vengenance Youth, the Heroes of the Return, and the Palestine Libera-
tion Front (PLF), under Ahmand Jibril, formed a coalition which became
15
the PFLP under the leadership of Habash. In all, about 30 fedayeen
groups announced themselves, but many later disbanded or joined Fatah,
PLO, or PFLP. In 1968, a Syrian-based organization, Sa'iqa, emerged
as a Syrian controlled element of the fedayeen.
As the new groups emerged, factionalism became an increasing
aspect of the PLO. After the Palestine National Council (PNC) was
formed, the PLO realized that it could not separate itself from the
fedayeen groups. In May 1968, the PLO allocated part of its 100 mem-
ber quasi-legislative body seats to the fedayeen groups according to the
groups' size and importance: 38 for Fatah, 10 for the PFLP, and 2 for
various groups. The remaining 50 seats went to the representatives of
the PLO administrative body, the PLA, the Palestine National Fund,
17
and student and labor syndicates. Rivalries and disputes increased
15Quandt, W. B. , Jabber, F. , and Lesch, A. M. , The Politics of
Palestinian Nationalism
, p. 58, UC Press, 1973.
1 f>Hammond, P. V. , Alexander, S. S. , Political Dynamics in the
Middle East
, p. 239, American Elsevice Publishing Company, Inc. , 1972




with the PFLP's refusing its cooperation with the PLO. The PFLP was
unwilling to allow its freedom of action curtailed by restricting its tactics,
and it was not satisfied with the number of seats it received in the PNC.
Arafat and Fatah began to emerge as the most important bloc. Arafat
dealt with heads of state and rallied the enthusiasm of the Arab masses
with his insistence on continuing the struggle against Israel. Unlike the
rashness of the PFLP, Fatah was furthering its goals by working within
the PLO.
At this time, Jordan was beginning to more openly oppose the fed-
ayeen groups in its quest to be the recognized representative of the
Palestinian people. This nation began criticizing the guerrillas, partic-
ularly Fatah, and it began to require fedayeen groups to obtain permits
to cross the Jordan River, the point of their base camps. At the same
time, Fatah was attempting to establish a foundation in the West Bank
for its operations against Israel. Terrorists' attacks mounted until the
exasperated Israelis mounted a large scale operation against the Fatah
base at Karameh on 21 March 1968. Before this time, the Israelis were
attempting to force Hussein's hand by inducing him to curb the fedayeen's
activities. The Israelis thought Hussein unable to do so, and they ini-
tiated this action to deny the fedayeen a sanctuary. The objective of the
Israelis was to eliminate Fatah bases and force them to move to other
areas.
For the first time in modern history, the Israelis struck across
the Jordan border, using infantry, tanks, armored personnel carriers,
24

and air support. At the same time, paratroopers, using helicopter
tactics, went ahead to secure the mountain area around Karameh. The
objectives of this move was to prevent the fedayeen from escaping east-
ward and to stop any Jordanian reinforcements from arriving on the
scene. This action resulted in a conflict between Fatah and Jordanian
units against the Israelis, an action which Hussein wished to avoid.
Although there were a number of Fatah casualties, the importance of
the battle, for fedayeen recruiting purposes, was that for the first time,
1
8
the Israeli army had been stopped in battle.
The battle marked a significant turning point, bringing to an end
the initial stages of the Fedayeen struggle. Revolutionary guerrilla
warfare had failed. The second stage of preparation was more success-
ful. The third stage, rapid expansion, was to begin. The PLO began
to receive taxes from Palestinians who were in Arab territories, an
action which had been endorsed by the Arab states. Hussein found him-
self pressured by other Arab leaders to permit Fatah free access and
movement within its territories.
This pressure on Hussein had begun in earnest in the mid-1960's.
Hussein had cooperated with the founding of the PLO, but he was un-
willing to permit PLA activities within its territory. Additionally, Jordan
refused Shukairy's request for withholding tax from the pay of Palestinians
Kuroda, Y. , "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socializa-
tion Perspective, " p. 239, The Middle East Journal, Summer 1972.
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in government employ. Shukairy addressed his severest criticism at
Jordan; his desire to establish for the PLO an independent military
and political status in Jordan was viewed as nothing less than a challenge
to its sovereignty. Hussein became increasingly aware of the disparity
in purpose and objective of the PLO, and he viewed it in the broader
context of reconciliation with Egypt and Shukairy's demands for the
right to tax Palestinians, to conscript them into the PLA and to distrib-
ute arms at border villages. For Hussein to submit to these demands
was not only a challenge of principle but also was bound to lead to
Israeli retaliation or internal revolution, or both. However, Hussein
took certain risks for a period of time. He attempted to gloss over the
differences in understandings of amity first in January and again in
March 1966. Cooperation and mutual consultation "on all matters
concerning the Palestine problem and the liberation of the conquered
fatherland" were pledged by Hussein. He permitted the PLO to acquire
the right to establish regional offices, and he granted permission for
a daily autonomous "PLO hour" broadcast on Amman Radio. He allowed
PLO officials to travel without restriction in Jordan, and frontier posts
were instructed to permit their free entry. Hussein also required civil
servants to contribute to the PLO fund, and he gave the PLO the free use
of telephones, telegrams, and postal facilities. He granted members




These concessions clearly implied greater Egyptian influence in
Jordan, and threatened to establish the PLO as a state within a state;
however, they were still insufficient to mollify Shukairy. On 2 April,
Jordan announced the purchase of American jet aircraft in preference
to the opportunity of buying USSR aircraft at a lower price through the
Unified Arab Command. This event signified a reversal for the PLO in
Jordan. Hussein followed this arms deal with a sweeping arrest of 200
subversives, including Ba'thists, Communists, and the PLO staff who
were then in Amman. This event broke the tenuous truce, and on 14
June Hussein through Radio Amman publicly ruled out further coopera-
tion with the PLO. In this radio broadcast he stated that there was no
longer any room for cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion in its present form and that all possibilities for cooperation had
vanished. In this broadcast he also stated that any action which went
beyond the framework erected by the (pan-Arab) summit conferences
and the Unified Arab Command for the liberation of Palestine would
19
split the Arab effort and lead only to catastrophe.
This statement, coupled with Jordanian actions, led the leadership
of the PLO to join with the Syrians in their cry that "the road to Tel
Aviv goes through Amman. " The UAR appeared to be reluctant at this
19 Jacobs, P.
,
The View From Tel Aviv and Beirut, p. 7,
Committee on New Alternatives in the Middle East, 1972.
27

time to end the detente it had observed with Jordan since the Cario
summit. At the same time, it could not easily endorse Hussein's
position despite the common agreement that the PLO had initially been
formed as a facade of militancy to conceal a policy of relaxation and
delay. The era of peaceful coexistence was coming to an end as the
result of events external to the Arab-Israeli issue. The failure of the
UAR to disengage from the Yemen, Hussein's support of King Faisal's
attempt to create a broad Islamic alliance, and the power shift in Syria
on 23 February 1966 combined to wreck the spirit of the summit and to
hasten the end of any kind of peaceful coexistence. Syria supported
Shukairy against Hussein and assumed a more vigorous role in the
planning and operations of Fatah. The era of the summit was finished
on 22 July 1966 when Nasir declared at a mass rally that Egypt would
not participate in summit meetings and would not have further discus-
sions with the "reactionaries. " Termination of the summits meant
that the period of collective action against Israel had ended. Syria
was now free to openly sponsor its unconventional war against Israel.
The Syrian Chief of Staff transferred all Palestine commanders to
purely Syrian units under Syrian officers and the Defense Ministry took
control of the money which had accumulated in Syrian banks for the
use of Palestine units and laid claim to all future funds raised for that
purpose. Simultaneously, the Syrian leadership announced the deporta-
tion of all Palestinian officers who had served in the Palestine units
formed in 1961-62 by Iraq's former leader, General Qasim. This
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action forced many Palestinian officers to leave the country with their
families.
Egypt, at this time, was in disagreement with the conservative
Arab regimes regarding Israel. It stressed the necessity for a clear
superiority over the Israeli army and the elimination of feudal and
reactionary Arab regimes as prerequisites to a successful war against
Israel. On the other hand, Syria continued to actively promote un-
conventional war in preparation for the final incursion through which
it believed the forces of revolutionary Arab socialism would unite.
Egypt did not consider the Fatah strikes against Israel as contributory
to the Arab goals. The fact that Fatah acted and the PLO merely plotted
and issued belligerent statements raised the prestige of Fatah among
the Arab refugees in Jordan. During the summer and fall of 1966, Fatah
increased its terror raids against Israel. These acts caused a dilemma
for the Israeli government which had to deal with public opinion. Israel
realized the raids were staged from Jordan but that the Syrian govern-
ment was also responsible for them. Any retaliatory strike against
the well fortified Golan Heights would result in too many casualties and
carried a risk of an all-out war with the Soviet client state. However,
not to retaliate would exasperate public opinion and encourage further
terrorism.
While the Israeli government was struggling with this dilemma,
both the Egyptian and Syrian governments were concerned with the
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possibilities of Israeli actions against either or both countries. Accord-
ingly, the leaders of both countries met in Cario in November and
signed a mutual defense treaty. The purpose of this pact was to bind
Syria to advance consultation and to deter Israel from striking Syria.
For the first time since Syrian secession from the UAR, diplomatic
relations were restored.
The Israeli government did not want to risk war or a confrontation
with the Soviets who were entrenched in both Syria and Egypt. The best
option for the Israelis was an attack on Jordan which might induce
Hussein to increase his vigilance and deny sanctuaries to the Fedayeen
groups, particularly Fatah. This thinking resulted in a raid on the
20
village of Es Samu on 13 November. This action proved ineffective
in achieving the desired results since its overall effect was to increase
pre-existing tension between Hussein and the Palestinians on the West
Bank. Discontent and frustration added to feelings against the govern-
ment in Amman added to wide-spread riots on the West Bank. The
demand now was for arms to defend the area against any future Israeli
attacks. The attack did little to pacify Israeli public opinion; many
felt the attack on the weaker Hussein was a sign of weakness. In Egypt,
Nasir had the same opinion since he felt the Egyptian army acted as a




strong deterrent to large-scale Israeli action against an Arab state
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allied to Egypt. Hussein did not share this feeling with Nasir and
he was not convinced of the value of a deterrent value of a defense pact
with Egypt. He felt that any Israeli action against the Arabs would be
directed against Jordan since it represented an easier target. He also
felt that Israeli action would be directed against Jordan since Israel
desired security in depth by expansion of the Jordan River.
The raid on the Jordanian village affected Shukairy and the PLO.
Until this raid, he had opposed terror raids for two reasons: the raids
were beyond his control, and he remained faithful to the idea of "paiu
Arab preparations" for the termination of Israel. Shukairy was faced
with the fact that any continued opposition to the terror raids advocated
by his rival, Fatah, would result in the risk of his losing the leadership
of the PLO or would result in the disintegration of the group. The
refugees on the West Bank observed Fatah action while the PLO was
involved in a war of words. Shukairy realized his basic strength was
with the militant refugees on the West Bank who had been enlisted in a
crusade against the Hussein regime. In November Shukairy announced
that Fedayeen raids from Jordan into Israel would begin again.
Hussein desired to keep both the Cario-supported PLO and the
Syrian-directed Fatah out of his state. This underlined his awareness
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that the revolutionary regimes in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq were promoting
a coordinated campaign against Jordan. He also realized these nations
would continue to send guerrillas from Syria to Jordan, an action de-
signed to keep Jordanian- Israeli border tensions at a peak. Events
proved his feelings. On 1 December Radio Amman announced a clash
between a Jordanian Army patrol and saboteurs from Syria at a point
close to the Jordan-Syria border. The broadcast also stated that three
captured saboteurs had admitted they had been trained in Syria and sent
into Jordan to destroy buildings, bridges, and military telephone lines.
This was the first case of Arab terrorist action directly implemented
against an Arab state rather than against Israel. Shukairy stated this
would not be the last when he said, "We are going to open two fronts . . .
22
one against Israel and one in Jordan. "
In the months preceding the June 1967 War, the incidents of
Fedayeen activities against Israel were low. Despite Shukairy's state-
ment, there were no known PLO-conducted raids against Israel in the
months immediately preceding the 1967 war.
C. THE EMERGENCE OF FATAH IN THE PLO
After the battle of Karameh in March 1968, Arafat began a deter-
mined move to take over the shattered PLO. His men seized PLO
22 Editorial, The New York Times, 7 November 1968,
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offices in the Middle East and Europe while others of Fatah infiltrated
into the PLO framework and were soon occupying key positions. The
Palestine National Council met from 10-17 July 1968 and issued the
Palestine National Covenant which stated that the only way to liberate
Palestine was by an armed struggle and that fedayeen action formed the
basis of this struggle. The slogan adopted was "national unity, mobiliza-
23
tion, and liberation. " In September 1968 Arafat was elected Chair-
man of the PLO Executive Committee. Arafat wished to increase his
influence in the Arab world and especially wanted the PLO seat on the
Arab League and the resulting subsidy. The suspicious Arab heads of
state were unwilling to allow him either one.
The popularity of the Fedayeen and Fatah increased, and Fedayeen
action against Israel continued with a steady increase in the possibility
of another Arab-Israeli conflict. This conflict erupted in October 1973,
the Yom Kippur War. Again, it was a conflict between troops, and both
Syria and Egypt scored initial successes. However, the tide of battle
turned and the Arab nations found themselves asking for a cease fire,
supervised by the UN. The importance of this war is marked by the
Arabs' belief and conviction that they were the victors in this struggle.








Meanwhile, Arafat continued to increase his influences not only
in the Arab nations but also in the rest of the world. In September 1970,
fighting broke out between Jordanian troops and Fatah. The conflict
resulted in more Palestinian casualties by Jordanian action than had
been inflicted by Israeli action in 1967. The war itself lasted for ten
days, and formally ended on 27 September. However, conflict between
the two groups continued for more than a year. The end result was that
the action of the civil war failed to crush the commandoes or to dethrone
the monarch. The casualties were nearly impossible to estimate since
bodies were buried in mass graves and victims were reluctant to ask for
medical aid for fear of reprisals.
Indirectly, the war may have taken the life of Egypt's President
Nasir who was suspected of betraying Palestinian interests by agreeing
to US-sponsored peace talks with Israel. Fatah thought he only half-
heartedly pressured Hussein to end the conflict, despite his sending
strong messages to the King and his organizing Arab leaders in Cario
to take collective action for a cease fire. Nasir, ill and overtired, put
his remaining energies into ending the struggle and died of a heart
attack the day after the 14 point accord was signed at the Cario Summit.
At the same time, Hussein's stature in the Arab world suffered
from his actions and the actions of his army during the conflict. He
finally bowed to the demands of his army and gave the bedouins the
freedom to put down the Palestinians who comprised two-thirds of the
34

Jordanian population in any manner they chose. This action earned the
King the names of "Butcher of Amman" and "Nero. " A further result of
this was the enmity of the peoples of the Middle East nations.
A further development of this civil war was that the Palestinians
believed their suspicions were confirmed that when it came to providing
help, many of their loudest supporters had other things to do. The
Fedayeen were not concerned that this inactivity might have been due
to pressures from the US or the USSR. Iraq, which had troops in the
northern battle area stepped back from the combat areas. Syria did
allow tanks and some Palestinians to move into Jordan from Syrian areas.
Al-Ahram, an Egyptian newspaper, reported that three regiments of the
Palestine Liberation Army were transferred from the Suez Canal to
Jordan. Other newspapers reported that Libya sent three planeloads of
regulars to aid the commandoes. Both Libya and Kuwait suspended annual
25
subsidies to Hussein, losses of $45, 000, 000 and 21, 000, 000 respectively.
Israel gained the most from the conflict and openly cheered for
Hussein's forces. The thinking of the Israeli government was that a
victorious Fedayeen regime would never negotiate with their government.
The civil war further benefitted Israel since during the war, commando
Focus on Political Developments, " Asia Research Bulletin ,





raids on Israeli territory were down to one, in the Julilyah settlement.
The clash between these two forces had become inevitable, due to
a series of continuous confrontations between the army and the fedayeen.
The latter had made a series of exploits which received the attention of
the world, a fact which maddened Hussein's men. The Palestinians had
developed a meaningful strike force, and as these men daily walked the
streets of Amman and other cities in Jordan, they were a reminder that
they and not the Jordanian Army were fighting Israel. Minor confronta-
tions between the two groups resulted in a growing number of casualties.
Hussein stated that he tried to hold his army in check but they felt obe-
dience to his orders made them look like women. He also said, "The
army was very upset with moves made by the Palestinians. They've had
enough. They aren't used to being insulted, denigrated, provoked with-
out being able to strike back. "
The incident which probably added the final insult was the Fedayeen's
skyjacking of four jetliners. The Jordanian Army was sent to the landing
area to free the planes and hostages, but they were forced to stand
helpless for six days because the commandos threatened to destroy the
aircraft and people. This was the crowning piece of humiliation and
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on 16 September, named a new military governor, and directed his new
premier to cope with the situation with appropriate effort, firmness, and
fortitude to restore security, order, and stability.
The civil war formally began on 17 September with the army's fight-
ing its way into Amman, using for the first time tanks and artillery on
the city. In the northern part of Jordan the conflict quickly spread,
especially along the commando supply routes to Syria. There were
reports of heavy fighting at Irbid, Zerqa, Ramtha, Salt, and Mafraq,
areas of heavy Palestinian populations.
On 18 September the military governor, Field Marshall Habis Majali,
issued an ultimatum to the Palestinians -- surrender or die by the firing
squad. This action was ineffectual as was the continuous appeals and
cease fires. The government announced curfews, only to lift them soon
afterwards. There were claims and counter-claims by both sides as to
who attacked whom and with what.
On 19 September the major event of the war occurred with the appear-
ance of approximately 250 tanks which came from the Syrian border.
Observers noted the emblems of the Palestine Liberation Army which
were on the sides of the tanks which were supported by 5, 000 men of the
Hitten brigade. Although Iraqi troops moved their equipment, tanks, and
men out of the way of these troops, the Palestinians charged them with
allowing Jordanian tanks and artillery to pass through their lines. The
resulting battles between the two forces, some very near Amman, caused
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large number of casualties on both sides. With no decisive victories on
either side, the Palestinians contradicted a long-standing policy and
called for the overthrow of Hussein. Prior to this, the Fedayeen leaders
had repeatedly stated their sole aim was the dismantlement of Israel for
a secular Palestine, not for the goal of governing Jordan. After the war,
Arafat insisted the commandos had not sought control of the government.
The civil war affected not only Jordan and the Palestinians but also
the major powers, the Arab League, and others. US Secretary of State,
William Rogers, asked Syria to stop the invasion since it carried the
danger of a broadened conflict. Syria denied its military presence in
Jordan, and the US retaliated with a strong show of force in West
Germany and the US. Several transports stood in readiness at Turkish
and European air bases. In the Mediterranean four aircraft carriers,
two guided-missile cruisers and other vessels steamed eastward. The
big four were in constant contact as they exerted words and veiled threats
to end the war. The US and the Soviets collaborated to stall a Security
Council session on Jordan and to restrain Arabs and Israelis from inter-
vening in the war. The US State Department acknowledged that Hussein
had made a request of them for help, but they refused to admit whether
he had actually sought military intervention. Hussein was also reportedly
to have asked the big four to exercise their influence in getting the Syrians
to pull out their forces which had entered the northern part of Jordan.
The request was for diplomatic not military assistance.
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At this time, others were reacting to the events in Jordan. The
Pope made three appeals for a truce and Peking announced its resolute
support for the Palestinians. Colonel Kaddafi of Libya threatened to
send armed forces to aid the commandos. In Israel, the cabinet held
at least one special session, moved armored detachments to the eastern
borders, and expansively sent massive truck convoys to Jordan with
relief supplies from the West Bank. The Israelis explained the Allon
Doctrine allowed them to offer help to "neighbors and regimes seeking
peace with Israel. " Meanwhile, Arab leaders postponed an emergency
meeting and sent a four man fact-finding delegation, headed by Sudan
Chief of Staff Gaafar al-Numeiry, to Amman. On the day after the group
arrived, tanks and troops began to withdraw toward the Syrian border.
Probably, the reason for Iraq's inertia and Syria's wariness about
entering the conflict was the tough words received in public and private
from Moscow. On 23 September President Nikolai Podgorny warned:
"The Soviet Union has consistently come out for this (a truce) in its
appeals made recently to a number of states - both those belonging and
not belonging to the area - and firmly stressed the inadmissibility of
external interference in developments in Jordan under any pretext
27
whatsoever. " On 24 September the US considered the situation to have
cooled to a point where military intervention was not needed to evacuate
its nationals from Jordan. Instead, it sent three chartered aircraft to
27
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airlift its citizens to Beirut.
Numeiry, who had left Amman, returned to that city on 25 Septem-
ber and got Hussein and Arafat to agree to a temporary cease-fire which
would be augmented with a formal peace declaration. Almost imme-
diately, the fedayeen groups charged the Jordanians with ignoring these
conditions. On 26 September Libya broke relations with Jordan and the
infuriated leaders in Cairo cabled Hussein and bluntly told him to halt
what they called a conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine resistance or
face retaliation from Arab countries. After receipt of this message,
Hussein's cabinet quit and the king rushed to Cairo on 27 September to
face his accusers and to make peace. Out of this session came a 14
point accord that dealt with everything from withdrawals of both com-
mandos and the army from Amman and prisoner releases to restitution
of pre-war rule in Jordan's cities and towns. At least seven articles
set out the duties of a supreme follow-up committee in enforcing the
peace. Its teeth were to be provided by collective and unified measures
upon transgression by any side by the nine signatories.
After Nasir's death on the 28th, there were numerous reported
truce violations and the follow-up committee had to keep running
around Jordan. With Nasir's death and the Arab League's reluctance
to provide real military might in Jordan, doubts grew about the punitive
powers described in the accord. Continued clashes, menacing move-




The aftermath of the hostilities were different for both groups.
Hussein, in October, appointed a new government under Wasfi et-Tal
to replace that of Premier Toukan. Tal was considered by the Fedayeen
as their avowed enemy who had planned one of the Jordanian Army's
sweeps against the commando bases in Amman. It was this action
which helped to escalate the September fighting. This appointment was
also viewed with concern by the other Arab states. Arafat announced
that the commandos had been strengthened by the war and were ready
for action. However, two key Fedayeen leaders, George Habash of the
PFLP and Nayef Hawatmeh of the PDFLP, had a $14, 000 price tag on
their heads by the Jordanians. There was speculation that their dis-
appearance from the scene might drive their groups underground. Both
before and after the war, much was made of the differences between the
Fedayeen leaders. However, these disputes did not affect the rank and
file of the Fedayeen who maintained the same goals. Indeed, the war
only intensified their feelings. The Cairo Agreement banished thousands
of Fedayeen regulars from the cities, but it left intact the all-important
militia.
As for the Jordanian government, it began to take deliveries from
the US on ammunition shipments, and Washington planned to replace
their weapons and tanks lost in the war. This fact led to speculation
that Hussein might begin a policy of suppression.
For approximately one year after the signing of the Cairo Agree-
ment, the Jordanian situation blew hot and cold so fast as to create a
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great deal of confusion as to what was going on. Both Arafat and Tal
delivered speeches in which they called for peace and quiet and for
ending the strife. During this period of time, both sides violated the
truce agreements. Commando actions generated speculations of new
tactics against the Jordanians. In Amman their action was aimed
primarily against three targets: police stations, the electricity
stations, and the water stations. These actions, along with cutting
telephone lines, affected directly day-to-day life in Jordan. They
indicated that any further confrontations with the Jordanian Army would
not be face-to-face but would be in actions where they could hit and
run. Commando articles admitted that they committed a grave error
in fighting a classical warfare with the Jordanian forces. PDFLP's
Hawatmeh was reported to have said they would resort to actual guer-
rilla warfare in the Jordanian cities.
The Follow-up Committee issued statements that both sides had
violated the agreements. They reported Fedayeen attacks and also
reported violations by the Jordanian forces against commando areas.
The Arab governments issued many statements to indicate their con-
cern about the situation; however, they appeared to be helpless in
putting an end to the tensions. For example, the Syrian government
issued statements that Syria would not stand idly by regarding the
attempts at liquidations of the commando movement. At the same
time, they also issued messages and statements that both sides should
stick to the agreements between them.
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The importance of this civil war is several fold. First, the con-
flict strengthened Arafat's and Fatah's dominance of the PLO; secondly,
the war and its results affect the current political situation as to the
recognition of the PLO. Thirdly, the war indirectly led to the Arab
leaders' recognition of the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians
Lastly, the war was one of the factors which contributed to the split
of the 'rejection front' from the PLO and Arafat.
The winner of the war is still undecided since Hussein was pressed
into a cease-fire before his army completed the finishing actions against
the Fedayeen. At the same time, Fatah was reminded by several
leaders that the enemy was Israel and not Jordan. The conflict of rep-
resentation is still alive since neither will give up his adamant claims
of representation, privately or publicly.
Although Fedayeen action was continuing, Fatah and Arafat scored
a tremendous victory in October 1974. The Arab leaders met at the
Rabat Summit and declared that the PLO should be the sole spokesman
for all Palestinians and should head an independent national authority
to be set up on any Palestinian land that was liberated from Israeli
control. The vote came on 28 October after several days of heated
debate by the 20 Arab leaders. This unanimous decision was taken at
the seventh Arab summit conference and was a blow to Hussein who had
to agree to the resolution and who had to relent on his resolve to exon-
erate Jordan of all responsibility for the task of recovering the West
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Bank. Much of this conference had been given to the claims by both
Jordan and the PLO concerning the West Bank. At one point, the PLO
threatened to withdraw from the talks unless they received support for
a three point proposal for PLO responsibility over all liberated
Palestinian territory. A spokesman for the PLO, Sayed Kamal, com-
plained on 24 October about the lack of response to the Palestinian pro-
posals and said that they had been met with 'complete silence from all
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Arab countries. ' On the same day, the conference approved a joint
Egyptian-Syrian working paper aimed at unifying the Arab stand regard-
ing the Middle East crisis but left the PLO- Jordanian rift unresolved.
After two days of debate, Hussein agreed with the 19 other coun-
tries' leaders on the resolution which stated:
1. The assertion of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to
return to their homeland and determine their own destiny.
2. The assertion of the rights of the Palestinians to establish
national authority under the leadership of the PLO, as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, over any liberated Palestinian
territory. The Arab states should back this authority when it is estab-
lished in all respects and at all levels.
3. To support the PLO in exercising its responsibilities on both
the national and international levels within the context of the Arab
commitment.
4. To call on, respectively, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the PLO to
lay down a formula organizing relations among them in the light of these
resolutions and for the sake of their implementation.
2 8




5. All the Arab states should undertake to preserve Palestinian
national unity and should not interfere in the internal affairs of Palestinian
7Q
action. 7
Several Arab newspapers printed that in return for Hussein's con-
cessions, the PLO had agreed to be represented at the next stage of
the Geneva peace conference as part of a joint delegation under the
name of Jordan. After the vote Arafat reportedly thanked Hussein for
his patriotic attitude and Hussein in turn pledged his support for the
Palestinian cause. After the conference a spokesman for the summit
declared that Israel and the US must bow to the Arab's decision to
create an independent Palestinian state or accept the risk of a new
military showdown, which the Arabs felt they could win due to their
'rapidly increasing power. ' Both Arafat and Hussein made public state-
ments in which they promised to solve the problems existing between
them. Hussein promised, in his statement, to continue all material
commitments to the people in occupied territories and to continue
existing administrative arrangements until other institutions were set
up. He also promised any Palestinian who chose to become a Jordanian
citizen would enjoy the rights and duties of full citizenship without
prejudicing his original rights in Palestine. He also promised that any
who chose the Palestinian identity would have the same rights enjoyed





other oil-rich nations promised Syria and Egypt one billion dollars a
year to devote to arms. Hussein was allocated 300 million dollars
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annually while the PLO was to receive 50 million dollars annually.
While Hussein lost his quest to represent the Palestinians, he did gain
substantial aid for his flagging economy.
Other than the resolutions from the Arab leaders, there were two
other occurrences which came about from the conference and affected
the PLO. The action at the Rabat Summit was the final event which
finalized a PLO split. On 2 6 September the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine had withdrawn from the PLO Executive Com-
mittee, accusing the PLO leadership of making secret contacts with the
United States. The PFLP was convinced that a Middle East settlement
was being prepared, and this would result in the expansion of US
influence and the legalizing of Israel and its security. At this point
they were also concerned about any concessions to what they termed
the 'puppet regime of Jordan. ' In other statements, the PFLP charged
the PLO with meeting with representatives of the US government to
improve the PLO position. The 'rejection front' is comprised of the
PFLP, the PFLP-General Command, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF),
and the Popular Struggle Front (PSF). After the Rabat Summit, the
'rejection front' completely withdrew from the PLO. At the root of the
30 Glubb, F. , "Hussein and the Rabat Verdict, " Middle East
International, p. 19, December 1974.
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dispute was an ideological conflict. The Marxist PFLP, opposed not
only Arafat but also such "reactionary" leaders as Hussein and King
Faisal of Saudia Arabia. Faisal had given generously to Fatah while
allocating nothing to the PFLP. The PFLP clings to the goal of creat-
ing a secular Palestine where Jews, Christians, and Moslems would
live together. Fatah would settle temporarily for Palestinian control
of the West Bank and Gaza. They argue that the alternative is that the
territory might return to Israeli control.
The 'rejection front' stated the reconciliation agreement reached
at the Rabat Summit flagrantly violated the PLO's aim of liberating all
of Palestine and the aim of setting up a progressive regime on the ruins
of the Jordanian regime. This was an open challenge to Arafat's leader-
ship, and the four declared they were standing up to condemn and categor-
ically reject the reconciliation resolution. They stated the PLO had
deviated from the revolution's line and that the only representative of
the Palestinian people is the rifle, which is fighting for liberation of all
31
Palestinian territory.
Fatah's rise as the representative of the Palestinians received a
boost in November 1974. In October the UN had voted to allow a
Palestinian representative to address the UN General Assembly, and on
13 November Arafat fulfilled this function on the first day of the debate
•3 1




on Palestine. Arafat spoke in Arabic and had a pistol in his pocket.
He began his speech to the Assembly with "I have come bearing an olive
32
branch and a freedom fighter's gun. " He asked the Assembly not to
let the olive branch fall from his hand and called upon the Jewish people
to 'turn away from the illusory promises made by Zionist ideology and
Judaism and Azionism. ' Later, during the speech, he stated that the
Palestinians were not against the Jewish faith but were in opposition
to what he termed the colonialist Zionist movement. He stated that in
this sense, the Palestinian issue was a revolution for the Jew.
Arafat spoke for one hour and twenty minutes. He pointed out that
those who encouraged Jewish emigration to Israel were depriving more
Palestinians of their homes and that the small number of Arabs remain-
ing inside Israel were treated as second-class citizens. He also com-
mented on the anti-Palestine crowds outside the UN building and asked
the US and its people why were they fighting the Palestinians and did
this serve the interests of the US. At the end of his speech he was given
a standing ovation and was escorted from the rostrum by the UN Chief
of Protocol, an honor usually accorded to heads of state. The US dele-
gate to the UN, John Scali, remained seated during the ovation and was
absent from the reception which was given in the evening. Israel's right
of reply was restricted due to an earlier vote to bar any delegate from
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speaking more than once in the debate on Palestine. The Israeli dele-
gate had spoken on 13 November in reply to Arafat and was prevented
from speaking again.
The debate on the Palestine issue continued until 22 November. At
the end of the debate the UN General Assembly voted on and adopted
a resolution which recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative
of the Palestinians. Besides this point, the resolution also reaffirmed
the right of self-determination without external interference and the
right to national independence and sovereignty. The resolution affirmed
the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from
which they had been displaced and uprooted. A further resolution
granted the PLO observer status at the UN.
Support for the Palestinians continued to build in the UN, sponsored
by the Arab and Third World nations. On 18 December 1974 the UN
adopted a resolution which called on Israel to allow the Palestinians to
return to their homes. Another resolution stated it was illegal for
Israel to exploit the resources of the occupied territories. The import-
ance of these resolutions for the PLO and the Palestinians was the fact
that the UN was going in a different direction from the UN Security
Council Resolution 242 which stressed the Palestinian refugee problem.
This term had long been a source of contention for the Palestinians.
This was the main difference between 242 and the General Assembly-
Resolution 3236, passed in November 1974.
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During 1975-1976 the Palestinian issue continued to be an integral
part of the business of the UN. The UN delegate for the PLO, Farouq
Qaddoumi, participated in debates and expoused the views of the PLO.
In November 1975 the UN had a Palestinian Week, and the General
Assembly passed three resolutions supporting the Palestinian cause.
The first resolution called for inviting the PLO to take part in all efforts,
debates, and conferences on the Middle East on equal footing with all
other parties. The second resolution formed a committee to follow up
the exercise by the Palestinian people of their own rights. To the PLO
this meant the UN would establish a committee which would devise a
formula to enable the Palestinians to exercise their legitimate rights
so that the question of Palestinian people's rights would not remain
more words on paper. The third resolution was the most controversial,
probably in the history of the UN. This resolution condemned zionism
and considered it to be a form of racialism. This resolution caused
an immediate furor and debates headed by the US and the common
market states. The Soviet Union formally addressed a message to the
US in which it officially requested a resumption of the Geneva conference
and participation of representatives of the Palestinian people through
the PLO on the same fotting as other parties concerned. The most
important aspect of this Soviet initiative was that it made no mention
of Resolution 242. This shift on which the conference was originally
based changed the character of the talks. The conference, if convened,
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would discuss the question of the national rights of the Palestinian
people and would not address the problem as only a question of refugees.
In 1976 the Security Council voted to allow the Palestine Liberation
Organization to participate with the rights of a UN member, an action
which caused great opposition by the US. Egypt, which had been sched-
uled to be the first speaker, turned over its place to the PLO repre-
sentative. By this action the Arab states were signaling that the main
purpose of the debate would be to increase the political standing of the
PLO. Qaddoumi in his speech stressed that there had been no change
in the PLO's hostility to Israel. He stated his group refused to rec-
ognize the existence of Israel and had rejected the key Council resolu-
tions - 242, adopted in 1967 and 338, adopted in 1973 - which were
viewed by most countries as the basis for a future negotiated settlement.
He said that neither took account of the rights of the Palestinians. Other
Middle East nations debated for the inclusion of the PLO in any settle-
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ment and the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories.
This speech by Qaddoumi was in contrast to Arafat's statement after
visiting Moscow in December 1975. In this statement the PLO for the
first time agreed that the Palestine problem could be solved on the
basis of guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian people and establish-
ing a Palestinian state 'according to UN resolutions. ' This meant the
33 Gwertzman, B.
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The Palestine Digest, p. 2, February 1976.

recognition of the existence of Israel. Such a Palestinian attitude had
never before been defined in any official or joint statement. Since that
time, there have been PLO statements which indicated the PLO would
deal with Israel and recognize its existence. At the same time, after
such statements were made, PLO representatives have stated that the
aim of the PLO for the the termination of Israel has not changed.
The prestige of the PLO continued its rise despite internal conflicts,
particularly with the 'rejection front. ' After each gain by the PLO in
world and international politics, the 'rejection front' published state-
ments which condemned the PLO and maintained the PLO had deviated
from the historic purpose to which all Palestinians were and are
dedicated. For Arafat and the PLO a historic decision was made on
6 September 1976 when the Arab League unanimously accepted the PLO
as a full member of that organization.
In April 1976 even the Israeli government seemed to soften its stand
on the PLO. Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin stated: "In the very, very
hypothetical eventuality that the PLO recognized Israel, Israel would
try to determine what this meant in practical terms and draw the con-
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elusions from the answers we receive. " Rabin stressed such a change
of policy by the PLO would have to include abandonment of the PLO
national charter which calls for the establishment of a secular state to
34
"Rabin Softens Stand Against the PLO, "' San Francisco Chronicle
,
p. 9, 1 May 1976.
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replace Israel. However, he also said this was not likely to happen.
This statement was a step back from previous statements in which
Rabin stated the PLO would never gain recognition from Israel even
if recognized by the US. He had termed Arafat's speeches in the UN
as declarations of war.
Even with these gains, not all was well for the PLO. With dis-
sension within the Fedayeen organizations and with interest waning in
the PLO, its fortunes of political prestige were in trouble.
D. PLO PRESTIGE -- DECLINING?
Today, it is difficult to establish the influence of the PLO and
Fedayeen groups on issues in the Middle East and Arab politics. The
contention of this writer is that after a show of support for the PLO and
Fedayeen, the Arab governments are still not willing to give full in-
dependent status to these groups. The main factor which has contrib-
uted to this belief was the situation of the civil war in Lebanon, an
event which still occasionally rises from the ashes of this war.
The PLO and Fedayeen groups became embroiled in this conflict
which was between Christians and Moslems. As the Palestinians be-
came the dominant factor on the Moslem side, they were counting on
the support from the Arab governments. The purpose of this thesis is
not to give a detailed account of this war; however, it is important to
note that Syria, which became involved as a peace-keeping force, turned
on the Palestinians and did not give them support. Instead, the
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Palestinians found themselves fighting not only the Christians but also
the Syrians.
Relations between the Egyptians and the PLO deteriorated rapidly
after a PLO warning in February 1975 that any partial settlement on
Sinai would be a betrayal of the Arab cause. This statement was made
after a session of the PLO Executive Committee and was addressed
specifically to Egypt. This release stated that this was a conspiracy
against the Arab cause and that the plans were aimed at undermining
the Palestine revolution and 'stabbing the Arab literation movement
step-by-ste. ' After hearing this statement, President Sadat refused to
receive a PLO delegation to discuss Arab-Israeli negotiations. In a
move which was tantamount to suspending relations with Egypt, the
PLO recalled Palestinian representatives from that country.
The windfall of the PLO in the UN was also declining. In a harshly
worded message on 19 May 1976, the PLO told the UN Security Council
that it would hoM the Security Council responsible for the 'serious
situation 1 in occupied Palestine. The document likened the Israeli
measures to Nazi atrocities during World War II. In September 1976
the UN undertook terrorism as a key issue for debate. Interest in this
issue, which had been on the General Assembly's agenda every year
since 1972, was revived by the Palestinian hi-jacking of a French air-
liner to Uganda in July 1976. West Germany immediately announced it
intended to seek anti-hijacking action in the Assembly. Some of the
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Arab governments began to have second thoughts about the legitimacy of
terrorism since it was being used against them by some of the Fedayeen
groups. Although the PLO had not participated in this action and even
though they had tried terrorists in some incidences, they became the
victim of this feeling against terrorism.
From its peak of spectacular prominence at the UN in 1974, the
PLO plunged in stature in world councils in October 1976. At this time
the General Assembly decided to deny the Palestinian observer delega-
tion access to the rostrum on the last day of general debate. The PLO
representative, Zehdi Labib Terzi, had sought to address the plenary
session in reply to charges made against it by Lebanon. In three weeks
of general debate, a majority of the 126 speakers failed to give any men-
tion to the Palestinians. This was in striking contrast to the two pre-
vious sessions in which tributes were routine. The most obvious factor
in this setback was the losses the movement suffered in combat in
Lebanon, a military collapse at the hands of Syrian armed forces, once
the Palestinians' staunchest supporter. Another factor was the over-all
mood of the General Assembly and its preoccupation with the problems
of southern Africa. This seems to have pushed Arab delegations into a
backseat role in deference to the more immediate concerns of their
African allies who had supported the Palestinians.
With the tensions and troubles mounting in Lebanon and the divisions
inside the Arab world, the presence of eager Palestinian representatives
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became what seemed like an embarrassment to many Arabs. This
problem still exists for the Palestinians and their different organizations.
The established Arab governments are more concerned with internal
and external problems than with the Palestinians. For example,
Jordanian spokesmen stated they were waiting for the PLO to prove it
is incapable of bringing about an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.
They also stated that Jordan would not accept the task unless requested
to do so by the Arabs. Egypt also later asked the PLO to allow Jordan to
negotiate a disengagement of forces agreement with Israel. The Egyptian
President stated no chance of a successful Geneva Peace talks would
come about unless the Arabs presented a unified front, particularly in
solving the contradictions between Jordan and the Palestine resistance
movement.
The hopes and the future of the PLO, the Palestinians, and the
Fedayeen are inescapably tied to the politics of the Arab world.
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II. ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERS
The structure of the Palestinians' institutions have changed radically
since their inception. The reasons for these changes are numerous and
often difficult to explain, and it is not the purpose of this paper to delve
into the complexities of these differences. However, in studying the
Palestinian organizations and leadership, one must be aware of several
factors which have importance in the internal affairs of the Fedayeen.
One factor is the differences between the Arab states. Some of these
states are sometimes bitter rivals and concern themselves with issues
which go beyond the issue of the liberation of Palestine. Another factor
is that the leaders of the Fedayeen groups are not in tune with the main
body of Palestinian nationalism, but they have instead sought to expand
the scope of their political activity and importance to the surrounding
Arab countries. Also, some of these leaders are from minority Moslem
and other religious groups, and as a result they have an interest in push-
ing for secular policies, such as those of the Marxist-Leninist camps.
Another factor is that cultural differences often foster competition
between the vested interests of the Palestinian leaders. This factor,
coupled with that of differences in social origin contribute to splits
within the Fedayeen groups. Some of these groups have been more
successful than others in their quests.
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The triumph of the Algerian revolution in 1962 gave more weight
to the principle of independent Palestinian entity. The Algerians were
able to recruit material and support from various Arab regimes and,
through armed struggle, to attain their independence. This led some
Palestinians to believe they could adopt the same kind of policy if they
took the initiative and maintained their freedom of action.
A. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION -- PLO
On Nasir's initiative the first Arab summit conference met in Cairo
13-16 January 1964 to discuss Israel's plans to divert the waters of the
Jordan River. Nasir was convinced that Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia
were trying to involve Egypt in a war with Israel, and he was determined
not to be pushed into a battle with that state until there was unity between
all Arab countries. This stand led the other Arab states to the conclu-
sion that Nasir had no intention of entering an Arab-Israeli war when
Israel would begin to pump water from the Sea of Galilee to the Negev.
The members of the conference issued a statement in which it decided
to organize the Palestinian people to enable them to have a part in
liberating Palestine and in determining its future.
Ahmed Shukairy was appointed as the representative of Palestine
at the Arab League. Shukairy, a Palestinian lawyer, had been assistant
secretary general of the Arab League and was later a member of the
Syrian delegation to the UN. After that, he was the UN delegate of
Saudi Arabia. The Arab leaders asked him to carry out consultations
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with representatives of the Palestinian people for the formation of a
new general government in exile. He was also asked to visit various
Arab capitals to discuss the means which the Arab governments would
place at his disposal for the fulfillment of this task.
On 19 February 1964 Shukairy began his tour of the Arab states to
discuss with the governments and Palestinians the drafting of the
Palestine National Charter. Also discussed was a draft constitution of
a liberation organization on which the "Palestine entity" would be based.
He returned to Cairo on 5 April 1964 and announced he had met with
thousands of Palestinians and had explained the charter and the basic
system of the new liberation organization.
On 2 8 May 388 representatives of Palestine from Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, Gaza, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq met in Jerusalem to open the
Palestine National Congress. This congress was held under the aus-
pices of the Arab League and adopted several important resolutions.
1. It established the PLO to be set up by the people of Palestine
in accordance with its statutes.
2. It called for immediate opening of camps for military training
of all Palestinians to prepare them for the liberation battle.
3. It established a Palestine National Fund to finance the PLO.
4. It elected Shukairy as chairman of the executive committee of
the PLO.
The second Arab summit conference, 5-11 September 1964, endorsed the
PLO and fixed the obligations of each Arab state towards the organization.
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It also endorsed the PLO decision to establish a Palestine Liberation
Army to be stationed along the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. The
PLO absorbed a number of the small organizations which had been estab-
lished in the early sixties. Some, such as Fatah and the ANM maintained
their separate identity, but they did participate in the PLO National
Congress.
Between this time and June 1967 the independent Palestinian organiza-
tions called for armed struggle to liberate Palestine. The independents
were held back by the Arab regimes which opposed independent guerrilla
warfare. Syria was the exception since it found in Fatah the incorporation
of its slogan calling for a popular war of liberation.
The Arab defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel proved to the
Palestinians that dependence on the Arab regimes and armies for the
liberation of Palestine would lead to atrophy. They felt there was no
empathy on the part of the Arab masses since there mind set was deter-
mined by their actions of the Arab governments which feared to arm the
masses. After the war there were a number of conferences to formulate
a Palestinian response to the defeat. The only formula approved was
that of armed struggle. Since these meetings did not lead to any practical
results, the independent Fedayeen organizations renewed their military
operations unilaterally.
In January Fatah called for a meeting of all Palestinians, including
the PLO and PFLP to be held in Cairo 17-19 January 1968. The PLO
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and PFLP did not attend the meeting on the grounds that some of the
invited organizations did not have significant or political weight. The
groups at this meeting established the Permanent Bureau for the
Palestinian Armed Struggle which included Fatah and eight lesser
organizations. This bureau existed until the fourth Palestinian National
Congress; however, the military wings of these organizations merged
with that of Fatah.
On 10 July 1968 the fourth Palestinian National Congress, attended
by the different commando organizations was held in Cairo. Ahmed
Shukairy did not attend this congress since he had been forced to resign
from the presidency of the PLO after a long struggle between him and
the majority of the Executive Committee. Other Palestinian organiza-
tions had been a part in forcing this resignation; they accused him of
being singularly responsible for the Palestinian decline and of being
more inclined to political maneuvering than to the running of the PLO.
The congress elected Yehya Hammouda, formerly the president of the
Jordanian Lawyers' Association, as acting president of the Executive
Committee. Hammouda had been barred from Jordan since 1957, being
accused as a communist. As president of the PLO Executive Committee,
he was given the responsibility of contacting the Palestinian commando
organizations and holding the fifth Palestinian National Congress within
six months
.
The Executive Committee held several meetings with the different
commando units, and from these meetings a formula of representation
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for the National Assembly of the PLO was devised. Fatah received
33 seats, 12 to the PFLP, 12 to al- Sa'iqah, 1 1 to the executive com-
mittee of the PLO, five to the PLA, one to the National Fund of the PLO,
three to students', workers' and women's organizations, and 28 to
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independents. The PFLP rejected this formula and refused to
participate. Instead it proposed a formula of one organization, one vote.
Fatah agreed to the executive committee's formula and issued a political
statement a few days prior to the congress. It announced its belief in
the PLO as a general and proper framework for Palestinian national
unity and stated it would participate in the conference and the Executive
Committee.
The fifth National Congress convened 1-4 February 1969 in Cairo,
and at the conclusion of the congress a new executive committee was
formed, headed by Yasir Arafat, official spokesman for the Fedayeen
group, Fatah. At the end of the congress a statement was issued, declar
ing the Palestinian cause was facing the danger of liquidation in the
interests of Zionism and imperialism through the UN Security Council
resolution 242. The statement rejected any Arab policies or inter-
national interventions which contradicted the Palestinians' right to
their country. It also urged Arab states to facilitate the residence,
work, and movement of Palestinians found on their soil. After the
^Setler, R. j pp. cit. , p. 141.
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congress Fatah announced it would retain its organizational independence.
Since 1969 Fatah has retained its control over the PLO and the
Executive Committee. This has not been an easy task for Fatah and
Arafat to do, because different Fedayeen groups, such as the PFLP and
the rejection front, have continually called for the dismissal of Arafat.
These groups often cite what they term as Fatah's deviationist behavior
toward the Palestinian cause. Arafat has had his moments of concern
but has always received the necessary vote of confidence to remain in
his position of power.
1. Organization''"
The PLO has made its headquarters in Damascus since the
PLO/ Jordanian civil war in September 1970. The Palestine National
Council meetings are usually held in Cairo at the Arab League Head-
quarters.
The Chairman of the PLO is Hasir Arafat who has been in this
post since 1969. He was last re-elected to the post on 12 January 1973.
a. Palestine National Council (PNC)
By PLO statutes, the PNC is the highest authority in the
PLO. In 1973 the number of members was increased to 180, and in
1975 the number expanded to 270. The members are selected according
to a set formula from among the Fedayeen groups, popular organizations,
^Appreciation is given to Dr. John Amos, Naval Postgraduate School,
National Security Affairs Department, for advice on structure.
63

and Palestinian communities in the Arab world. The delegates serve
three-year terms. The PLO statutes call for members of the PNC to
be popularly elected; in actuality, the delegates are appointed by their
organizations or communities.
Officially, the Council's functions are to legislate policy
and resolutions and to elect members of the PLO Executive Committee
which is to carry out PNC policies. The problem has not been to formu-
late policy and resolutions but to carry them out.
Of the membership of the PNC, 85 members represent
Fedayeen groups, with Fatah's being the dominant organization. The
PNC is headed by Speaker Khalid al-Fahum, and the PNC is organized
into committees. The PNC must approve any amendment to the PLCs
constitution and National Charter by a two-thirds vote.
b. Central Council (CC)
The Central Council was established to be a liaison between
the PLO and the PNC. The CC has 41 members and includes all mem-
bers of the Executive Committee, as well as representatives of Fedayeen
groups. Theoretically, the CC is the PLO's supreme authority when
the PNC is not in session.
c. Executive Committee (EX COM)
This group is elected by the PNC and is the PLO's highest
executive authority. It is the actual center of power in the PLO since
the Chairman is in effect the Palestinian Chief of State.
64

The EX COM was begun in 1964, but from late 1970 to
July 1971, it was absorbed by an ad-hoc committee which was created
to enable the PLO to coordinate .all efforts in the struggle with Jordan.
This committee was dissolved in 1971.
The EX COM has varied in size; it presently consists of
13 members since the PFLP withdrew from the EX COM and the CC in
September 1974. However, the PFLP did keep its seats in the PNC
(about 15). The EX COM is organized into departments, headed by
EX COM members. These departments correspond roughly to cabinet
positions.
(1) Political and International Affairs Department
This department is headed by Fatah member Faruq
Qaddoumi who is in effect the PLCs foreign minister. The Deputy
Director is Sa'id Kamal, and the UN representative is Sa'adat Hasan.
This department supervises PLO offices abroad, which, according to
Palestinian sources, number 143.
(2) Military Department
This department is headed by Sa'iqa chief, Zuhayr
Mushin. It theoretically supervises the PLA, but the problem is a
long-standing feud between the groups. There are two main divisions
in this department: the PLA and the Popular Armed Struggle Command.
The PLA has three brigades: Ain Jallut, Hittin, and Qaddisiyya. All
are stationed in Arab countries and are controlled by the host
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governments. The Popular Armed Struggle Command is confined mostly
to police duties in refugee camps. Each of the six major Fedayeen
groups under the PLO has its own military arm independent of the PLA,
but each is expected to coordinate its military activity through the Gen-
eral Command.
d. General Command of the Palestine Revolution
This department is headed by Arafat and is a coordinating
body designed to control and integrate the activities of ail Fedayeen
groups.
e. Popular Organizations Department
This department includes labor unions and student groups
with membership in Palestinian communities. The most prominent of
these are the General Union of Palestine Students (Europe and Middle
East nations) and the General Union of Palestine Workers with head-
quarters in Damascus. The department was headed by the PFLP EX
COM representative, Ahmed Yamani who withdrew from the EX COM
in September 1974. He has not been replaced.
f. Information Department
This department is headed by Yasser Abd-Rabbou, PDFLP
EX COM representative. The department supervises the Unified Infor-
mation Command, led by Fatah member Majid Abu Sharrai.
The following are the publications of the PLO: Falastin al
Thawra and Palestine Information Bulletin. The department also includes
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the PLO news agency, WAFA and the Voice of Palestine Radio, Cairo,
which was closed by Sadat on 1 1 September 1975.
In addition, each major Fedayeen group publishes its own
information bulletins or newspapers:
PFLP -- Al Hadaf (Beirut Weekly)
PDFLP -- Al Horriya (Marxist Weekly)
PFLP/GC -- Elal Amam (Beirut Weekly)
ALF -- Al Tha'u al-Arabi
g. Other Bodies reporting directly to the EX COM
(1) Palestine Planning Center
This department is headed by Nabil Aha'th and conducts
studies which are of interest to PLO leaders.
(2) Palestine National Fund
This group is the PLCs treasury. Funds for the PLO
come from contributions from Arab governments, taxes on PLO employ-
ees, and fund-raising drives such as the Joint Palestine Appeal. The
PNF is directed by EX COM member, Walid Qamhawi.
B. FATAH
Armed resistance has been a way of life for Palestinians since they
took up arms against foreign rule during the British Mandate. Even
before the revolution of 1936, there had been a long period of political
struggle by the Palestinians by protests, demonstrations, strikes, and
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attempts at dissuading the British from supporting the Israelis' move
for independence. In 1948 the state of Israel was established and the
Palestinians found themselves without a homeland and dispersed to
refugee camps. The first reaction was to resist any kind of rapproche-
ment which would lead to a final settlement with the state of Israel.
Active Palestinian groups became affiliated with national Arab parties
which called for Arab unity. The Palestinians believed this was the
road to a strong unified Arab state capable of confronting Israel and
liberating Palestine. In the light of these activities, Fatah came into
being.
In Gaza the Palestinians who had not been allowed by the Egyptians
to organize independently, formed their own underground during the short
Israeli occupation. These cells formed in 1956 became the nucleus for
Fatah and its various rivals despite the Egyptians who were anxious to
avoid provoking the Israelis after the 1956 War. The Egyptians for the
next ten years arrested anyone suspected of any kind of commando
activity. The nucleus for Fatah was formed by Arafat (Abu Ammar)
with Khalil al Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Salah Khalaf (Abu Ayad). In the
summer of 1957 these men, along with a few others, met outside the
town of Kuwait. Most were from Gaza, but some had come from Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Besides the original three, there were
Faruq al Qaddoumi (Abu Lutuf), Muhamed Yussif al Najar (Abu Yusif),
Khalid al Hassan (Abu Said), and Kamal Adwan. These seven men and
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Arafat remained the core of Fatah leadership which gave the organization
a factor of cohesion and stability. Abu Yusif and Kamal Adwan were
later killed by Israeli raiders in Beirut.
This group founded an organization to liberate Palestine. They
decided on the name Fath, a name composed of the initials, spelled




These words mean the Movement of the Liberation of Palestine, and
the initials are pronounced Fatah. The word Fath had
special significance for the founders, since it meant victory and was an
allusion to the Koranic account of the promise given by God to the
Prophet Mohammed when he was in Medina. God promised him victory
over his enemies if he would return to Mecca which he did and was
victorious. Fatah equated the Palestinians' return to Palestine with
Mohammed's return to Mecca.
Arafat insisted Fatah must not follow any particular ideology except
the liberation of Palestine and that it was the duty of Palestinians to
put aside their political party loyalties and unite for this single objective.
In an interview in 1975 Arafat stated: "Our ideological theory is very
simple. Our country has been occupied. The majority of our people
have been kicked out by Zionism and Imperialism from their homes. '
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He went on to say, "We wait for the justice of the United Nations, for
the justice of the world, while our people are suffering. But nothing
of this was realized. None of our hopes. We have believed that the
only way to return to our homes and our land is the armed struggle.
We believe in this theory without any complications and with complete
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clarity and this is our aim and our hope. "
Fatah did not agree with the Arab states' doctrine of preparing for
an inevitable decisive confrontation at some unspecified date in the future
and avoiding military involvement in the meantime. Instead, Fatah
believed the Palestinians should take their fate into their own hands.
It also rejected a related scheme for a war of surprise which would
last one week and would eliminate Israel in a single rush. Fatah believed
this strategy would not give the Palestinians any function in the struggle
and there would be no cure for the psychological and spiritual sickness
which had kept them dormant for two decades. They believed the Arab
states would have to be dragged into a war with Israel.
Fatah went about realizing its own concept of the liberation of
Palestine by establishing training camps for commandos and Palestinian
youth. The commando course lasted for three months, a course recruits
had to follow before joining one of the Asifa fighting units. To begin the
course, the men had to pass medical, physical fitness, and psychological
-3 /
"An Interview with Yassir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO,
World Marxist Review, p. 126, February 1975.
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tests. At the end of the course, the men had to undergo a week of
maneuvers. If they failed this test, they were assigned to nonmilitary
tasks or had to repeat some part of the course.
The youth of Fatah are organized into paramilitary youth training
units called Ashbal. Ashbal was begun in 1967 and is intended for boys
who range in age from eight to fourteen. Fatah explains to visitors
that the Ashbal is not just a paramilitary organization, but rather it
is a morale -building and educational movement to prepare the well-
rounded future citizen of Palestine. He will be equipped and trained to
defend his nation but also to be a good, productive citizen.
Fatah, in addition to the services provided by the UNRWA, had
established its own clinics, hospitals, convalescent homes, and special
schools for the children of its own 'martyrs' who had been killed in
action. Of particular importance were the 'Popular Resistance Militia'
whose men report for training by Fatah professionals in their spare
time and return to their homes at night. They are difficult to distinguish
from regular Fedayeen because they wear the same diversified kind of
outdoor clothing. The militia, which numbered more men than the
regular commandos, played a vital role in the various confrontations
between the Jordanian government and the Fedayeen movement.
The leadership of Fatah has remained basically the same and the
group has had its ups and downs. They became the most powerful group
in the PLO and remain the dominant force in that organization. This
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has been in spite of the conflict with the 'rejection front' and some dis-
trust from the major Arab governments. Fatah leaders, in their role
as spokesmen for the PLO, have spoken before the UN, and it has estab-
lished offices in more than 140 cities in the nations of the world. The
freedom of movement for the group has been severely curtailed in con-
flicts such as the Jordanian Civil War in 1970 and the civil war in
Lebanon.
After the Jordanian conflict Fatah lost its freedom of movement
from Jordan, and it suffered a great number of casualties. The most
important result of the war for Fatah was its recognition in 1974, as
the leading group in the PLO, as the representative of all the Palestinian
people. This led to recognition by the UN through the PLO, an important
event since Arafat spoke to that organization. The civil war in Lebanon
perhaps caused the most changes in Fatah. Syria entered the conflict
against Fatah and the Fedayeen groups, although Fatah, at times,
attempted to play the role of peace-maker. The war caused Fatah-
Sa'iqa clashes in Lebanon. For example, these units fought on 6 Dec-
ember 1976 at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near the northern
Lebanese town of Tripoli. The battle came after a Fatah member and
a Sa'iqa member had a dispute on the day before and the Fatah member
was killed. The man's friends and relatives attacked the Sa'iqa head-




in the fighting. The result of the battle was Sa'iqa's calling for the
removal of the PLO leadership, including Arafat, Farouq Qaddoumi,
and Khalil Wazir.
The war also resulted in the PLO's and Fatah's calling, for the
first time, for military conscription. They stated the conscription
would be for every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 30. The
war also continued the rift between Fatah and the PFLP despite a rap-
prochement in early 1976. The differences between the two groups
arose in August 1976 over an Arab League-sponsored plan for a cease-
fire in Lebanon. The PFLP leader who had not taken part in the pro-
posed solutions launched a bitter attack against Arafat. Habash accused
Arafat and the Arab League of planning a solution which would stop the
Palestinian revolution and would force the Palestinians to become a part
of the established Arab nations. There does not seem to be a solution
to this rift in the near future.
The war in Lebanon did outwardly change the goals of Fatah in that
it turned from guerrilla attacks on Israel to a position of possible nego-
tiated settlement. Qaddoumi, on 15 November 1976, expressed support
for a plan for the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This was in response to a UN plan
which called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from these areas.
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The plan also provided for a phase in which the UN would arrange for
Palestinians displaced since 1948 to be given a choice of returning to
their homes or receiving compensation. This also prompted another
spokesman to state that Fatah and the PLO were willing to consider a
change of tactics which would end attacks against Israelis and explore
chances of Arab- Jewish coexistence. Fatah was reported to be conduct-
ing contacts with 'an increasing number of Jews' about transforming
Israel intp a non-sectarian state for Arabs and Jews. The spokesman
announced that no Israeli settlement where some inhabitants were taking
part in such a dialogue would be attacked by Palestinian guerrillas. He
added that Arafat and the PLO Executive Committee had agreed to discuss
the amendment of its national charter to state that all Israelis would be
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welcome to take part in an Arab- Jewish state.
What is the future of Fatah? This question is vital to the interests
of Fatah and may well be determined by the positions it takes in any
Arab-Palestinian-Israeli settlement. Since the October 1973 War, the
position of Fatah has been characterized by flexibility and moderation
over tactics and means related to the ultimate goal of liberation. The
linkage between Palestinian patriotism and Arab nationalism seems to
reflect Fatah's interest in avoiding the negative charge of local patriotism.
Concerning the ideology of a proposed new state, Fatah takes no position





and leaves it to the people to decide the political and socio-economic
framework upon which their state should be built. Since the beginning
of Fatah, it has avoided casting its political program within any ideo-
logical context. It has insisted that its primary goal is Palestinian
national independence from what it terms the Zionist enemy. It has
retained the principles of a Palestinian entity and of liberation; however,
it has adopted a moderate attitude toward a peaceful approach. Because
of the preponderant military and political weight of Fatah within the
Palestinian resistance, this new element of moderation seems to have
been adopted by the general organizational framework of the resistance
organizations, the PLO. By staying away from ideology, Fatah seems
to have maintained the traditional content of Palestinian political thought.
However, it has introduced such important changes as political flexi-
bility and a realistic appraisal of available options, thus helping the
PLO to gain international recognition for the national rights of the
Palestinian people. Should Fatah, as a moderate group, fail to achieve
the establishment of a Palestinian state, the prospects are that the PLO
will either be overtaken by the radicals, or possibly, the PLO will turn
to radicalism. The consequences of such an occurrence are numerous.
Such a development would be a danger to Israel, would result in more
human losses to the Palestinians, a possible radicalization or the over-




C. THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
(PFLP)
The PFLP's ideology reveals a deep seated rejection of conciliation
with Israel and a relatively long tradition of belief in the necessity of
Arab unity as a precondition for the recovery of Palestine. This
organization can trace its roots to the 1948 War and the experiences
of Dr. George Habash.
In 1952 the publication of a secret weekly bulletin was begun by the
Committee for Resisting Peace with Israel, composed of students at
the American University of Beirut. This group was the nucleus of the
Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), founded by Habash. Habash was a
student of medicine at the AUB, and he was stirred by the approaching
crisis as the time for British withdrawal from Palestine neared. On
his return to his home in Lydda, he was in the company of thousands
of refugees; it was this flight of Palestinians which was the turning
point for Habash who resolved to combine his medical career with
political activity.
The members of the ANM devised a small non-ideological move-
ment which had the overriding objective of liberating Palestine. It had
39
as its motto, "Unity, Liberation, Revenge. " Its main objective was
to mobilize all Arab parties against any peaceful settlement with Israel
The ANM was suspicious of any plans initiated by the UNRWA and the
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US to settle the Palestinian refugees in Arab countries, because they
felt these two parties were interested in the elimination of the tension
which existed between the Arab states and Israel. In this light, the
ANM spoke through its weekly, al-Tha'r (The Revenge), and stated that
Palestinians should resist any program intended for the betterment of
their living conditions lest this lead to a solution of the Palestinian
40problem -short of the recovery of Palestine.
The ANM, as a rule, embraced the principles of Nasir. About
1957 it added the ultimate objective of building a unified socialist-
democratic Arab society in which social justice and liberty would be
the prevailing doctrine. After Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab
Republic in 195 8, the ANM dropped the emphasis on revenge and em-
phasized the theme of "Unity, Liberation, Progress, the Recovery of
Palestine, " and later developed the theme of "Unity, Freedom, Social-
ism, and the Recovery of Palestine. " Habash argued against the use
of commandos to fight the Israelis; he was more interested in political
organization than in guerrilla warfare. Until now, Fatah was the only
group which called for the adoption of the principle of armed struggle
as the means to liberate Palestine and believed the Palestinians should
begin armed struggle regardless of the reaction or plans of the Arab





between the Palestinian armed struggle and the plans of the progressive
regimes, like the United Arab Republic. The reason for this thinking
was to avoid a premature confrontation between the Arabs and Israelis.
The break between Egypt and Syria in 1961 raised a series of heated
debates within the ranks of the ANM. Within the ANM there were two
groups who were attempting to better define the ideology of the
organization. Nabash, along with Hani al-Hindi, Wadi Haddad, and
Ahmad al-Khatib, insisted the doctrine of socialism must be under-
taken in a peaceful way. The other group, which was less powerful
and led by Muhsin Ibrahim, argued for an ideological framework which
would be based on the Marxist theory of class struggle. Following
this, the second group maintained that the liberation of Palestine
should follow the Marxist-Leninist revolution based on class struggle
and a people's war of national liberation.
The Palestinian branch of the ANM formed a military group in
1964 to undertake reconnaissance operations inside the occupied
territories and to establish a network and arms caches. This branch
of the ANM became known as Abtal al-Audah (Heroes of the Return)
and begun its military operations in November 1966. After its emer-
gence Abtal al-Audah became associated with the Palestine Liberation
Army for financial reasons.
The June 1967 War affected the thinking of Habash and strengthened
the ideological position of Ibrahim's faction of the ANM. The war
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reinforced the leftists' position that neither the programs of Nasir or
the Bathists in Syria could liberate Palestine. In the light of this
background Abtal al-Audah merged with the Popular Liberation Front
and the Vengenance Youth to form the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine. The date of this merger varies with different versions,
but the PFLP did begin its military operations on 6 October 1967. The
Six Day War frustrated Habash and the moderates, and they acquiesced
to the demands of the left wing. They saw that Nasir and the Bath
parties had failed to achieve Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine,
and they turned to Marxism-Leninism to emulate what they considered
to be victories in Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, and elsewhere.
Numerically the PFLP is much smaller than Fatah and is con-
sidered to be more extremist than Fatah. It is Fatah's main competitor
for the hegemony of the Palestinian movement, and in this light the PFLP
has disagreed with Fatah's and the PLO's policies of the Palestinian
homeland. It has also disagreed with the procedures and tactics to
regain the homeland. It began to sponsor a long series of imaginative
exploits of terrorism and hijackings of airliners to emphasize that the
war with Israel was and is a national liberation war which requires the
recruitment of the widest sections of the Palestinian people. Habash
stressed that the leading cadres of the PFLP should be in the hands of
those who are committed to the ideology of the proletariat.
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The PFLP began its exploits on 23 July 1968 with the hijacking of
an El Al airliner flying from Rome to Tel Aviv. The plane was flown
to Algiers where the crew, one of whom was wounded, and 15 Israeli
passengers were freed with the plane. The hijackings continued until
the high point of this tactic was reached on 6 September 1970. On that
date PFLP commandos hijacked a TWA 707, a Swissair DC- 8, and a
Pan American 747. The TWA and Swissair aircraft were flown to
"Revolution Airport" (Dawson Airfield) in Jordan; the Pan Am aircraft
was flown to Cairo Airport where it was destroyed after the passengers
had been released. An attempt on a fourth aircraft, an El Al 707, was
foiled when Israeli Security men on board killed one of the hijackers
and captured Leila Khaled, a heroine of a 1969 hijacking. The aircraft
landed at London's Heathrow airport. The commandos demanded the
release of seven of its commandos held in prisons in Switzerland,
West Germany, and Leila Khaled in England. They also demanded the
release of commandos held by the Israelis. The British appeared
reluctant to comply with the demands, so on 9 September the PFLP
hijacked a BOAC VC-10 aircraft with 104 passengers and crew on board.
This airplane was also flown to the airfield in Jordan, near Zurqa. The
PFLP exchanged the hostages for the freedom of its commandos in
Europe, including Leila Khaled; the commandos then destroyed the
40
aircraft on the Jordanian airfield. The PFLP continued its exploits
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both inside Israel and in Europe. The organization began to U3e teen-
agers, particularly in Europe, to carry out acts of terrorism. The
PFLP began to develop working relationships with other revolutionary
organizations in various parts of the world. This was in line with their
doctrine of hitting Israeli targets wherever they may be. This differed
from Fatah' s doctrine of restricting its operations to inside Israel.
In March 1972 the PFLP Congress defined the principles of revolu-
tionary action, including 'Making a profound and comprehensive acquaint-
ance with all the principles and tactics of guerrilla warfare and learning
41from the experiences of other struggling peoples. ' To follow this
principle, the PFLP established ties with the Japanese Red Army, the
Turkish Liberation Army, the Black Panthers in the US, the Tupamaros
in Brazil, the Irish Republican Army, and the Baader-Meinhoff gang in
West Germany. The impact of these relationships for the PFLP would
be considerable in that its foreign operations would be aided if it had
help from the revolutionary groups of the countries where operations
would be carried out. The foreign groups could also assist the PFLP
by providing information which would be essential to the planning of an
operation and by providing personnel and arms. An example of this
relationship with foreign groups is the hijacking of an Air France air-
liner in July 1976 to Uganda where the PFLP was aided by members
41
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from the Baader-Meinhoff gang. This hijacking resulted in Israel's
mounting a daring rescue operation to destroy the terrorists and to
rescue the crew of the airplane and the Israeli hostages who had been
retained by the commandos.
Habash and the PFLP leaders developed the philosophy behind this
type of operations. The PFLP has no illusions about being able to hurt
Israel seriously or to defeat the Israelis with such exploits. However,
they feel this kind of action focuses world attention on the Palestine
national movement and what the commandos would like to call the
'revolution. ' If the world refused to take note of the Palestinians as
a nation, the PFLP would force it to do so. According to PFLP phil-
osophy, the group uses teen-agers to point out to the world that the whole
Palestinian community is imbued with revolutionary fervor. The PFLP
was anxious to convey the idea these people were not the usual stereo-
types of the Arab, such as the refugee who forever exchanges one
miserable hovel for another in his camps.
Habash and the PFLP attempt to interact with Fatah in such a way
that it can force Fatah to the left. This, on occasion, has been success-
ful; however, Fatah in its rise to power has forced the PFLP to go more
underground. Habash continually attacks the PLO and Fatah doctrines
and calls for a unified struggle against Israel. To date, it has not had
much success, since the ruling Arab regimes are reluctant to embrace
the philosophy of this radical group. They, instead, mount their support
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behind the less radical Fatah and the PLO as the hopes of the
Palestinians.
Ideology has mattered more to the PFLP than to Fatah. The latter
has maintained the traditional content of Palestinian thought while the
PFLP and others have emphasized the importance of ideology for the
promotion of the goals of the Palestinian resistance movement. These
movements have been a modernizing factor in Palestinian politics since
they introduce the ideas of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Trotsky into
Palestinian political thought.
There are three central themes in the PFLP ideology: the enemy
camp, the Arab Front theory, and the Marxist-Leninist principle. In
the enemy camp theme the PFLP identifies four parties as enemies:
Israel, world Zionism, world imperialism, and Arab reaction. The
group also divides the Palestinians into two groups: those who live
under Israeli occupation and whom Israel wants to use to establish a
Palestinian mini-state on the West Bank; the second group comprises
those Palestinians who may be inclined to join the revolution. The
PFLP divides the Arab states into two categories: nationalist and
reactionary. The nationalists, such as Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, to
the PFLP, oppose imperialism and refuse to accept a peaceful settle-
ment with Israel. The reactionary regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and
Jordan, are portrayed as the protectors of imperialism in the Arab
areas and are considered the most likely to strike the first blow against
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the revolution. The PFLP also contends the Palestinians are involved
in a struggle of an international dimension which is complemented by-
movements of national liberation and revolutionary forces world-wide.
On the Arab Front theory the PFLP centers on Arab unity and on
an Arab nation. In this it calls for a broad national front, comprised
of all Palestinian groups, to be prepared to join the fight against Israel.
The PFLP introduced concepts such as 'Arab Hanoi' and the 'Arab Front, '
and it emphasizes this will be a front to contain Israel on all sides.
In the Marxist principle as a guide to action the PFLP believes in
an organizational doctrine to build a revolutionary party. It also believes
a political doctrine is indispensable for the identification of the enemies
of the Palestinian revolution. The PFLP doctrine does not preclude
other classes from joining the peasants and workers, provided they do
not aim to help formulate policy. This is a Marxism which gives priority
to armed struggle and national liberation over ideological purity. The
PFLP believes, too, in a military strategy which would be able to cope
with a military enemy which has both experience and a superior war
potential. It recommends a strategy which incorporates two key
elements. The first is a guerrilla type of protracted war of national
liberation. The second is a mobilization of the Arab and Palestinian
masses and the enlisting of the support of the socialist countries and
movements of national liberation in the Third World. It calls for a
Jordanian-Palestinian national front which will be bent on the overthrow
84

of the regime of Hussein; in this way Jordanian territory would be the
natural point of departure for military activities against Israel. The
PFLP terms the central objectives underlying the struggle as the realiza-
tion of the aims of the Arab revolution against imperialism and capitalism
and the destruction of the political and socio-economic structures of
Israel. The PFLP argues that once this occurs, there will be a suprem-
42
acy of the national bond over the bond of the family or clan.
The focus is on the struggle between the PFLP and Fatah for the
supremacy of the Palestinian cause. If Fatah, as a moderate, fails to
establish a Palestinian state, then the PFLP is ready to step in and
turn the movement more towards the radical.
D. AL-SA'IQA
This Fedayeen group is probably the most important one to have been
formed after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It came into being as a
result of the Syrian regime's desire to increase its influence within the
Fedayeen movement. The official term for this group is The Vanguard
of the People's War of Liberation, but it is more commonly known as
al-Sa'iqa (the Lightning Bolt). The ruling Ba'th Party, after June 1967,
decided to withhold support from Fatah and the ANM, and instead, it
formed its own commando force. Sa'iqa drew on Syria for funds and




"Moderates and Rejectionists Within the Palestine
Liberation Organization, " The Middle East Journal




include drafted Syrian officers and men from the Syrian Army and its
main bases are in the Damascus -Darra region of Syria, with branches
now in Lebanon.
Sa'iqa was organized into a more hierarchical and rigid organization
than were the other commando organizations. This reflects the more
rigid training which was given to the Syrian officers and men. At first
Sa'iqa sided with Fatah and supported the doctrine of liberation before
the settling of ideological quarrels. It was, as a rule, more hostile
to the PFLP, reflecting the Syrian attitudes towards its rival. However,
it was usually cooperative with some of the other Fedayeen groups.
Internal Syrian politics seem to have directly influenced the growth
of Sa'iqa. Salah Jadid, deputy head of the Ba'th Party, seems to have
attempted to use Sa'iqa to further his own position and ambitions within
the party by using the group as a military instrument against the military
arm of the party. Hafiz al-Asad took control of the Ba'th Party and the
leadership of Syria in November 1970, and he immediately changed the
leadership of Sa'iqa. Until this time, the group had been headed by
Muhammad al-Mu'aita and Dafi Jumai'ani. Asad appointed Zuhayr
Muhsin as the spokesman for the group; however, the real power con-
tinued to be wielded in Damascus.
During the Lebanonese Civil War a major rift developed between
Fatah and Sa'iqa due to the fact that the latter supported the Syrian
Army in its moves against the Palestinians in Lebanon. This rift
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contributed to differing discussions in the PLO EX COM, although the
Syrian organization did not withdraw from the EX COM. This rift seems
to have been settled, although there have been flare-ups of violence in
Lebanon since the peace accord was established.
Syria and Sa'iqa have been playing a role in softening the position of
the PLO towards the peace process. There have been strains in the
relationships between Syria and Egypt and Egypt and the PLO after the
signing of the Egyptian- Israeli Sinai Accord in September 1975. Syria
seems to have been a moderating influence on the PLO, especially after
the Syrian- Jordanian rapprochement in August 1975. This rapproche-
ment was a Syrian- Jordanian accord which stipulated the coordination
of the political, military, economic, and educational programs of the
two countries.
Although there have been differences between Sa'iqa, Fatah, and
the PLO, these three, with the influence of Syria, have combined to
propose solutions to the Palestinian problems.
E. THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF
PALESTINE (PDFLP)
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's drift towards
the left did not satisfy its own left wing which wanted complete identifica-
tion with the international revolutionary movement. In May 1968 Habash
went to Damascus to inquire about a supply convoy which had been con-
fiscated, and he was imprisoned on a charge of plotting to overthrow
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the Syrian government. Before his rescue, Nayef Hawatmeh, an East
Bank Christian Jordanian, effectively usurped the leadership of the
PFLP. At first the movement was effective since most of the PFLP's
Central Committee joined the new organization. However, this success
was soon followed by failure and weakness. Their differences with
Habash soon deteriorated into street brawls, and the better armed
Habash faction was able to use force to intimidate the younger group.
The two factions turned to Fatah in mediating their dispute, and in
February 1969 the PLO recognized the PDFLP as a separate commando
organization. The PDFLP won control of the party newspaper, al-Hur -
riyah
,
forcing the PFLP to publish its own journal. The PDFLP accept-
ed aid from Syria while the PFLP turned to Syria's bitter rival, Iraq,
for support.
The importance of the PDFLP was unquestionable, because they
served as a focus for young European leftist intellectuals who were
beginning to take an interest in the Palestinian movement. These
Europeans, who offered their services as volunteers, identified more
easily with the PDFLP's purely Marxist or Maoist concepts than with
Fatah 1 s Palestinian nationalism.
Ideology was the basis of the PDFLP's split from the PFLP. The
former called for the breaking off of all relations of subservience with
the Arab regimes whether they were progressive or reactionary. They
also criticized the other Palestinian groups, especially Fatah and the
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PLO, saying they were led by the'petty bourgeoisie' and its ideology.
The PDFLP believed this had proved its failure in the 1967 defeat.
The PDFLP called for a long-term war of popular liberation against
imperialism and Zionism and also called for the establishment of a
Marxist-Leninist party which would be completely committed to the
ideology favorable to the dispossessed peasants and workers. Both the
PFLP and the PDFLP were in agreement on the rejection of Fatah's
policy of non- involvement in the internal matters of Arab states. They
both maintained that the overthrow of reactionary regimes and revolu-
tion throughout the Arab world are prerequisites to the liberation of
Palestine.
The difference between the two groups focused on the method of
conflict and the nature of the Palestinian state. The PFLP believes in
maintaining certain relations with the progressive Arab governments.
They see these relations as necessary to secure financial and military
support which is vital for the survival of the group and the resistance
movement in general. The PFLP maintains armed conflict is the method
by which to unite the masses. The PDFLP seems to place initial em-
phasis on political and educational organization and only after that,
armed struggle. As to the nature of the state, the PDFLP was the only
one of the Fedayeen groups which accepted, seriously, the slogan of a
'Democratic Palestine. ' They indicated they did not mean by this one
man, one vote but rather a popular democracy. The platform of the
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PDFLP recognized that the Israelis constitute not a religious community
but rather a community with a cultural identify of its own. With this
concept the group has attempted to initiate discussions with like-minded
Israelis such as the leftists in the Matzpen party in Israel. The PDFLP
calls for an Arab federation, a concept which is much less far-reaching
than the call for complete unity. This concept has aroused many of
their previous supporters against them, and those supporters have
returned to the original PFLP.
The conflict between the two organizations continues. The stronger
PFLP continues to attack the offices and personnel of the PDFLP. As
this is occurring, the less -powerful group continues to attempt to gain
support from whatever source it can.
F. POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE -
GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC)
This is another group which split from the main PFLP organization.
It is on the opposite end of the political spectrum from the PDFLP;
this is a small but comparatively effective terrorist group and is sup-
ported by Syrian and Libyan sources. The PFLP-GC split from the
PFLP in the fall of 1968 and is headed by Ahmad Jibril. This group
has operated under various names, such as Palestine Liberation Front
43
and the al-Aqsa Fedayeen Front. Jabril is described as the most
effective terrorist organizer, and he is opposed to any development
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which constitutes a deviation or a supplement to the Palestinian National
Covenant. He is also opposed to any cooling of the Lebanese-Israeli
border. The goal of this group is to renew the fedayeen spirit and to
carry out suicide missions. The PFLP-GC believes the resistance
should be primarily concerned with military operations and not politico-
ideological matters.
The Arab Report & Record reported in its issue 1-15 October 1976,
page 617, that on 7 October fighting broke out between rival members of
the PFLP-GC. The fighting occurred when a dispute arose between the
supporters of Jabril and supporters of the spokesman, Abul-Abbas.
Abul-Abbas, in a statement on 7 October, reported Jabril had been dis-
missed as leader of the organization because of his 'treacherous practices'
as an ally of the Syrian conspirators. Jabril was reported to have replied
on 8 October with a statement accusing Abul-Abbas of being an Iraqi agent.
Damascus Radio reported on 9 October that the PFLP-GC Central Com-
mittee had issued a statement on the 'criminal aggression' on the PFLP-
GC by the agents of the Iraqi Intelligence service in Lebanon.
The status of the politics of leadership within the organization is not
known. However, this writer supports the belief that Jabril, with his
followers, maintains control.
G. ARAB LITERATION FRONT (ALF)
This group is the Iraqi equivalent of the Syrian Sa'iqa and was formed
in 1969 after Iraqi- Fatah disputes. The ALF quickly became involved in
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the rivalry between Fatah and the PFLP and is a member of the rejec-
tion front. The group is headed by Abd al-Wahhab al-Kay-yali, Secre-
tary General, and Dr. Zeid Haydar.
H. LEADERSHIP OF FEDAYEEN GROUPS
The purpose of this section is not to give a complete biographical
background, but it is to give the reader an insight to the personal history
of each leader. These brief histories will aid the reader in understand-
ing the philosophies of these leaders, thus often determining the philos-
ophies of their organizations. The information for these biographies
were compiled from data found in An-Nahar Arab Reports profiles.
1. Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar) -- Chairman: PLO/EX COM
The details of Arafat's early life are sketchy. According to
PLO claims, this is because the PLO does not wish to create a cult of
personality in the resistance movement.
Arafat was born in Jerusalem in 1929 and is related to the
prominent Husayni clan. When he was young, his family moved to Egypt,
and at the age of 17 he became involved in Palestinian politics when he
returned to Jerusalem to be secretary to Abd al-Qadir Husayni, a hero
of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. He owes his political philosophy largely
to Husayni and to Abd el-Kader who achieved fame during the 'Great
Arab Revolt. ' After 1948 Arafat returned to Egypt where he studied
engineering at Faud (Cairo) University. Here, he concentrated his
92

efforts in organizing the Palestinian students at the university and
developed friendships with a number of those who would later be his
colleagues in Fatah. He founded the Union of Palestinian Students in
Egypt, a forerunner of the General Union of Palestinian Students. This
organization had close ties with the Muslim Brothers which called for a
return to Islam. Because this group attempted an unsuccessful assassina-
tion on Nasir, Nasir allegedly was always suspicious and contemptuous of
Arafat.
Arafat was graduated in 1956 and then served as a demolition
expert with the Egyptian Army in the 1956 Suez Canal fighting. It was
here he received his experiences as a fedayeen and conceived the idea
of sending his own fedayeen forces against Israel. He was expelled from
Egypt (his followers say departed), and he spent 1957 in Kuwait. It was
here that the first meeting of Fatah was held. Arafat worked for a time
for the Kuwait government and then began his own construction firm.
This latter move allowed him to give more time to Fatah recruiting.
In early I960 Arafat spent some time in Algeria, and he was
impressed with the FLN and their efforts at independence. He met with
little success in his early efforts to imitate FLN recruiting procedures,
and he had to rely on the criminal element for recruits. In his later
attempts to emulate those recruiting procedures, he was more successful,
mainly because of the June 1967 War.
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In 1967 Arafat was commander of Fatah 1 s Jordanian forces and
in early 1968 he was named Fatah spokesman and de-facto chief. In Feb-
ruary 1969 he was named Chairman of the PLO and the Executive Com-
mittee. Since that time, he has gained international recognition. He has
been invited to speak privately with the leaders of many nations, and in
197 4 he was invited and did speak before the UN General Assembly. He
has withstood several challenges to his leadership from both inside and
outside the PLO and Fatah.
Arafat is unmarried and a Summi Moslem who practices his
religion faithfully. He speaks some English, and he is an intense, active
individual who spends much of his time in Fatah refugee camps.
2. George Habash -- Secretary General, PFLP
Habash is slightly older than the general run of commando
leaders. He gives the impression less of a guerrilla than of a distin-
guished, rather scholarly physician. Habash was born in 1926 to Greek
Orthodox parents in Lydda. He studied in Jerusalem and earned a BA at
American University of Beirut in 1947.
As the time for British withdrawal from Palestine approached,
he was stirred by the approaching crisis and returned to Lydda. At the
time of the 1948 war, he fled with thousands of Palestinians to Ramallah
in the Arab-held part of Palestine. Here, he resolved to combine his
medical career with political activity to avenge his people.
His ideological roots are in the classic version of Pan-Arab
nationalism. He founded the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1950 after
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returning to American University of Beirut to study medicine. He
received his medical degree in 1951 and went to Amman where he opened
a medical clinic and continued to be active in politics. He was forced to
leave Jordan after he had been implicated in the anti-regime riots of
1957, and he fled to Syria. In both Amman and Damascus his clinics
became known as places where the poor could expect free attention.
Habash was forced to leave Damascus when the Ba'th Party achieved its
coup in 1963, and he went to Lebanon. Younger radicals in the ANM
introduced Marxist ideas and began to attack Habash and other original
members. The ANM became a Marxist group and by December 1967,
the PFLP was established over which Habash, in time, assumed total
command.
In May 196 8 Habash went to Syria to inquire about a supply
convoy which had been confiscated. He was arrested in Damascus and
was imprisoned on a charge of plotting to overthrow the government.
After he had been held for six months, his men succeeded in staging a
daring rescue. They seized him as he was being transferred from one
prison to another during an attempted coup. After his escape, he
returned to Jordan. While he was in prison, he maintained his leader-
ship of the PFLP.
Habash is often in conflict with Arafat over the concept of the
liberation of Palestine. Habash believes Palestine can be liberated
only through the union of Arab states into a single, dedicated nation,
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strong enough to overpower Israel. He is also anti-American and has
developed a central theme that Israel is America and America is Israel.
He believes that ultimately all American interests will have to be driven
out of the Middle East. In 1974 he led the PFLP out of the PLO/EX COM
and blasted Arafat's 'capitulationist' leadership. He maintains this posi-
tion at the time of this writing.
Habash has been in poor health for some time and suffered a
heart attack in 1972. In 1974 he was treated in Bulgaria, apparently
for his heart. Habash is married and has two daughters. Because of
frequent threats to his life, he lives in strict secrecy and his movements
are guarded.
3. Zuhayr Muhsin -- Secretary General, al-Sa'iqa
Muhsin was born in Tulkarm about 1936. At the age of 17 he
joined the Ba'th Party and was imprisoned in Jordan in 1957 for polit-
ical activities. After his release, he taught school in Qatar, but he was
deported from there for illegal political activities and moved to Kuwait.
He remained there as a school teacher until 1967 when he moved to
Damascus. Here, he became active in Ba'thist activities. He became
vice chairman of the PNC in 1968 after he had joined Sa'iqa in 1967.
In 1970 he became commander of Sa'iqa forces in Lebanon. After the
Syrian coup in 1970, Sa'iqa was split, and Muhsin led the pro-Asad
Sa-iqa forces and took control of the group. He became a member of
the PLO/EX COM in 1971 and became head of the Military Department.
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Muhsin is an ally of the moderate wing of the PLO, and he has
hinted at PLO recognition of Israel, providing Israel withdraws to the
borders established in the 1947 partition plan. He does not give up on
the PLO declared aim of a democratic, secular state in all of Palestine,
but he maintains the implementation of the partition plan would halt the
state of war between the PLO and Israel. During the recent civil war
in Lebanon, Muhsin supported the Syrian moves in that nation, a fact
which brought him and Arafat into conflict. Presently, these two seem
to have resolved their differences.
Muhsin is unmarried, and he has a brother, Majid Muhsin, who
is commander of Sa'iqa forces in Lebanon. The other members of his
family live in Tulkarm. As a member of the Ba'th Party, he has close
ties with Syrian leaders. His thinking usually reflects official Syrian
policy on Middle Eastern and Palestinian matters.
4. Nayef Hawatmeh -- Secretary General, PDFLP
Hawatmeh was born in 1935 in Salt to a Greek Orthodox family.
He is one of the few Palestinians' leaders who come originally from the
EastBank. Hawatmeh received his early education in Amman, and then,
he studied at Cairo University. He finally earned his degree in the mid-
1960's from Arab University of Beirut.
Having joined the ANM in 1954, Hawatmeh, in 195 7, was impris
oned by the Jordanian authorities and was exiled from that country. He
moved to Iraq where his politics landed him in trouble and he reportedly
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spent some time in prison before leaving that country in 1963. After
Iraq, he went to Beirut where he remained until after the June 1967 War.
After the war he went to Aden where he was an advisor to the leaders of
the new People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. He has written a book
on his Yemen experiences : The Crisis in the South Yemenite Revolution.
Hawatmeh has had a poor relationship with Habash, and he pulled
out of the PFLP in February 1969, forming the PDFLP. He is usually
considered a moderate and endorses a West Bank/Gaza National Authority.
He agrees with Arafat on most issues, but the two disagree over the form
of Palestinian government-in-exile. He has good relations with the USSR
and is often referred to as the Soviet's man in the PLO.
The PDFLP disavows terrorist activities outside the 'occupied
territories' and has not been involved in hi-jackings. However, in May
1974 the PDFLP attacked an Israeli school in Ma'alot and Hawatmeh
stated such activities would continue.
Hawatmeh, a bachelor, understands English, but he does not
speak it well. He divides his time between Beirut and Damascus.
5. Ahmad Jabril -- Secretary General, PFLP-GC
Jabril was born in Yazur, near Jaffa, about 1936. His family
was refugees in 1948 and settled in Syria where he entered the Syrian
Military Academy. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the
Syrian Army Engineer Corps in the mid-1950's. In 1958 he was dis-
missed from the Army because of his communist leanings. He remained
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in Damascus and formed the Palestine Liberation Front in 1961. The
PLF was supported and trained by the Syrian government to carry out
limited raids in Israel. After June 1967 he joined forces with the PFLP,
but because of ideological differences, the PLF withdrew from the PFLP
in November 1968. It then became the PFLP-GC. Since the split, the
group has concentrated on terrorist activities.
Jabril joined with the PLO after the June 1974 PNC meetings.
This caused an adverse reaction within the PFLP-GC, and the group
virtually disintegrated. It did, however, become a part of the 'rejection
front. ' Indications are that the group was revitalized and resumed
operations.
Jabril speaks excellent French and English. He is sometimes
referred to as Abu Jihad. He is an explosives expert and is considered
the most knowledgeable military tactician in the Palestinian ranks. He
has a reputation for skill and resourcefulness in sabotage operations.
6. Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali -- Secretary General, ALF
al-Kayyali was born either in Haifa or Jaffa in 1939. He received
a BA from American University of Beirut in 1961 and an MA degree in
international relations in 1965. In 1968 he earned a PhD in history at
London University. His dissertation, a study of political history of
Palestine from 1880 to I960, was published as a book.
In April 1969 the Ba'th Party of Iraq formed the ALF in reaction
to Syria and Sa'iqa. al-Kayyali joined soon afterwards. He has been
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Secretary General since 1971 and a member of the PLO/EX COM since
January 1973. He is a member of the 'rejection front' and is an opponent
to any negotiations between Israel and the PLO. He also opposes a
Palestine National Authority. He walked out of the June 1974 PNC meet-
ing and announced he had withdrawn from the EX COM. However, he
apparently still heads the PLO's Cultural and Educational Department.
al-Kayyali married an American, Susan Sweeney, in Washington,
D.C., in 1966; they have one daughter, Randa, born in 1970. He is a
publisher of many books (all Arabic) about the Palestinian problem. He
speaks fluent English and has visited the US several times. He now lives




III. UNITED STATES POLICIES
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the policy of the United
States as it concerns the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinians themselves. Because the vast majority of the policies of
the US deal with the major Middle East Countries, this chapter must
be limited to the policies which affect the Palestinians. Also, because
the policies of the United States have mainly been centered around Israel,
the policies of Israel, concerning the Palestinians, will be included. It
is not feasible to include every political statement which has been made
concerning this subject. Therefore, only those statements which will give
the significance of this problem will be included.
A. ORIGINS OF INVOLVEMENT
The United States was first attracted to the Middle East after World
War I when Great Britain attempted to monopolize the vast oil reserves
of this area. Britain moved into this region by securing a mandate from
the League of Nations to Palestine and Iraq (then known as Mesopotamia).
British companies managed to corner more than half of the world's known
reserves by 1919- The US, having fueled the war from its reserves,
protested British tactics and demanded its share. US companies joined




The United States had little influence on postwar peace settlements
in the Middle East and Palestine policies. However, a strong strategic
interest did emerge at the end of World War II when the US gradually
began to fill the political role which the British and French were forced
to relinquish.
The fundamental reason for the United States' Middle East policy is
its commitment to Israel, dating from decisive support for the United
Nations' plan which led to the creation of the Jewish state. However,
support for Israeli created strong anti-American feelings in Arab coun-
tries, opening many of them to Soviet influence. Paradoxically, Egyptian
President Sadat regards the United States as the only country that can
pressure Israel into returning Arab territory since Israel depends on
the US for support. Anxious to reduce his own country's dependence
on the Soviet Union, Sadat expelled its military advisers in 1972, and
on 14 March 1976, he abrogated Egypt's treaty of friendship with that
nation. Sadat has staked his peace efforts on US diplomacy.
The United States is fearful of both a new oil embargo and a revival
of Soviet influence in the Middle East if peace talks fail. In this light,
President Ford, in discussions with President Sadat on 1 June 1975,
emphasized that "the United States will not tolerate stagnation in our
efforts for a negotiated settlement -- stagnation and a stalemate will not
43be tolerated.
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The United States had little concern about the Palestinians until
the event of the June 1967 Arab- Israeli War. This conflict lasted for
six days and brought the Palestinian issue to the attention of the US
politicians. President Johnson, in his first major statement on US
Middle East policy after the war, stated on 19 June 1973 that the Israeli
troops must be withdrawn. However, he made it clear he would not
press for a withdrawal to prewar lines in every respect. In this speech
he stated the US was committed to peace in the Middle East, based on
five principles. Included in these principles were the right to national
life, justice for the refugees, and political independence and territorial
44
integrity for all.
On 22 November 1967 the United Nations approved Security Council
Resolution 242 which was aimed at bringing peace to the Middle East.
This resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
occupied Arab territories, an end to the state of beligerency between
the Arab nations and Israel, territorial integrity and political independ-
ence of every nation in the area, the establishment of secure and recog-
nized national boundaries, and a just settlement of the refugee problem.
Much disagreement between nations has been evident concerning
the precise meaning of this resolution. The Arabs contend that the
44
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document requires total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, the
Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and
the eastern sector of Jerusalem. On the other side, the Israelis have
insisted the phrasing of the resolution - withdrawal 'from territories' -
did not require a total pullback from the 1967 cease-fire lines. For
the Palestinians the source of disagreement with the resolution is the
phrasing of the refugee problem. The Palestinian organizations are
adamant in their efforts to delete this phase from UN discussions.
C. JANUARY 1968 - JANUARY 1977
Resolution 242 provided the basis for subsequent United States
peace proposals in the Middle East. The major elements of the US
diplomatic position were outlined by Secretary of State, William P.
Rogers, on 9 December 1969. In what is known as the Rogers Peace
Plan, Rogers called on Israel ti withdraw from Arab territories which
it had occupied in the 1967 war. This step would be in return for Arab
assurances of a binding commitment of a Middle East peace. These
proposals were rejected by Israel and were scorned by the Arabs.
The PLC" and the Fedayeen groups were all unanimous in their rejection
of the plan, because it had no firm, acceptable solutions for the Palestin-
ian problem.
In the meantime, the United States continued its support of the UN
efforts of Gunnar V. Jarring to mediate a settlement between the Arabs
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and Israelis. On 25 January 1970 President Nixon reaffirmed US sup-
port for Israeli's insistence on direct peace negotiations with the
Arabs. Five days later, he asserted that the United States was
. 45
"neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israeli. We are pro-peace. "
Later in 1970, Nixon reiterated that the United States would not
allow the military balance to shift against Israel. Rogers had stated
the US had not excluded the possibility of participating in a Middle
East peacekeeping role, but he did rule out any joint US-USSR force
in the area. In the next year, the Nixon administration offered a new
proposal for indirect, American mediated talks between Israel and
Egypt on an interim peace settlement which included a troop pullback
and reopening of the Suez Canal. These negotiations made little head-
way due to the opposition from both Israel and Egypt. The Palestinians,
along with Syria, denounced these proposals on the basis they did not
include them in any settlement.
By the time of the October 1973 War, Henry A. Kissinger had
assumed the office of US Secretary of State. After this war Kissinger
and the United States assumed a leadership role in attempting to bring
about a peace settlement. Kissinger initiated what he called his 'step-
by'step diplomacy. ' These Kissinger shuttles produced troop dis-
engagement accords between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula
45
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on 14 January 1974 and between Israel and Syria ir. the Golan Heights on
31 May 1974.
The United States had begun to mend its relations with the Arab
States during this time, relations which had been weak or nonexistent
since 1945. Kissinger and Sadat agreed to resume diplomatic relations
which had been broken since 1967. United States and Syrian relations
were resumed in the summer of 1974. These diplomatic relations
were immediately denounced by the Fedayeen groups. Fatah and the
PLO asserted that no peace in the Middle East could be effective unless
they were involved in the negotiations. The PLO continued to hold to
its Palestine National Covenant which included Article 9 which states
that armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. It also
held to Article 19 which states that the partitioning of Palestine in 1947
and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal. The-
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led its anti-American
campaign with warnings to the Arab world of American influence in
the Middle East and American aspirations to develop an American
state in the area.
The PLO, since the 1967 war, had become an influence which the
United States and the Arab world could not ignore. This organization
came more to the fore-front in any settlement of the Middle East
problem. After the 1973 war, the US took a more active interest in
the PLO and its role as the representative of the Palestinian people.
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This was particularly true after the Rabat Summit in 1974 which recog-
nized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians.
Kissinger visited the Middle East again on 5 November 1974.
During this trip he met with the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
In his talks with Kissinger Sadat urged him to consider a change in
American policy towards the PLO. At the same time he received
assurances from Kissinger that Egypt-Israeli negotiations would not
be affected by the Rabat decisions. According to Arab sources,
Kissinger proposed a peace plan for the Middle East. It was reported
the plan had four points. The first was a partial withdrawal of Israel
from from Sinai in exchange of non-belligerence by Egypt. The second
point was for a final settlement on the Jordanian front, giving Hussein
administrative control over the major towns of the West Bank, except
Jerusalem, while giving Israel control of the countryside. The third
point advocated a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces on the Golan
Heights in the area of Qunaitra but continued occupation of strategically
important areas by Israel. The fourth asked for a unanimous resolu-
46
tion by the Arab oil-producing states to lower the price of oil. The
PLO immediately rejected these peace proposals and warned that
Israel was preparing for another war. It accused the US and Israel
of trying to force a settlement outside the framework of the Geneva
conference and of trying to exclude both the PLO and the USSR from
46
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107

from the talks. The PLO called on the Arab states to use the oil
embargo as a weapon to force the United States to meet Arab demands.
Arafat stated he would like to have talks with Kissinger, but he warned
the US against any military intervention in the Middle East. He also
warned the Arab states to be aware of any attempts to impose an
American solution on the Middle East. He then repeated that the US
47
must change its attitude and that Kissinger had to recognize the PLO.
The PLO received presidential attention on 24 November when
President Ford and Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev
issued a joint communique after talks at Vladivostok. This communique
referred to the 'legitimate interests of the Palestinian people. ' It went
on to state that the search for peace in the Middle East should be based
on UN Security Council Resolution 338, 'taking into account the legitimate
interests of all the peoples in the area, including the Palestinian people,
and respect for the right to independent existence of all states in the
i.
'
This communique followed the UN recognition of the PLO on
22 November. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution contain-
ing nine points. These points included: the right to self-determination
without external interferences and the right to national independence
and sovereignty; reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinians to





and uprooted and calls for their return; and requests the Secretary-
General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
48
tion on all matters concerning the question of Palestine.
Zuhayr Muhsin followed these statements with his own on 25 Nov-
ember. In an interview he stated that if Israel would withdraw to the
borders of the Jewish state decided by the United Nations in 1947, then
the Palestinians would continue their struggle by peaceful means. He
added that withdrawal to the 1967 borders would not be sufficient 'to
prevent individual Palestinians from seeking to restore their full
rights by force. ' Yitzak Rabin, Israeli Premier, gave an immediate
reply by stating Israel would never agree to talks with the PLO even
if the US granted it recognition. He described Arafat's UN speech as
a declaration of war. Rabin totally rejected the establishment of a
Palestinian state to replace the Hashemite regime of Jordan. He
stated: "A change in status would begin with one thing - with Soviet
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arms flowing into Jordan. Israeli Information Minister, Aharon
Yariv, followed this statement with an address to the Knesset. He
promised that the Israeli Security Forces would deal unceasing blows
at the terrorist bases and routes in Lebanon and promised that all
48







manpower and resources would be fully mobilized for this war against
terrorism.
Kissinger continued his visits to the Middle East and his 'step-by-
step diplomacy. ' He met with little success as far as the Palestinians
were concerned; this is indicated by their statements after his visits
when they almost always condemned his tactics. In the meantime,
others in the US political arena were beginning to address the Middle
East situation. Senator George McGovern, Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, visited seven Middle East nations from 21 March
to 9 April 1975. On his return he submitted a report to Senator John
Sparkman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. This report
did not constitute a recognized policy of the United States. In his report
Senator McGovern addressed what he termed 'certain permanent
realities. ' These were Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians.
On Israel he stated that the vital interests for the US is in the survival
and security of that nation as an independent state. On the Arab states
he stated that the presence and growing power of permanent, independent
Arab states, some of them richly endowed with oil, is a firm reality.
He indicated the US and Israel could benefit from good relations with
them. He went on to state that the presence of several million Pales-
tinians with an uncertain future and an unsatisfactory present were an
inescapable reality. He also stated that peace cannot be made or
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before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Com-
mittee on International Relations. This testimony contained the first
comprehensive US government analysis of the Palestine problem and
contained new elements in the government's view of the Palestinian
problem and ways of solving it.
The document emphasized the importance of the role of the Pales-
tinians in the peace process and the fact that the Palestinians did consti-
tute a political factor and were not just refugees. It also asserted the
necessity of involving the Palestinians in negotiations, but it did not
state how or on what basis since there was no clear definition of the
goal of Palestinians. It stated the necessity of finding a reasonable
definition of the interests of the Palestinians. Saunders stated that two
main conditions, besides interests, should be met before the Palestinians
could join in negotiations. The first was to find a common basis for
negotiations which would be acceptable to both Palestinians and Israelis.
He supported the thesis that this could be achieved through the joint
acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. He pointed out
that these resolutions did not deal with the political aspect of the Pales-
tine problem. His second condition was that there must be agreement
on who will carry out negotiations in the name of the Palestinians.
Saunders told the committee that the United States believed that Jordan
would be a reasonable negotiator of issues relating to the Palestinians,
and then reminded the committee the Rabat Summit had recognized the
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designated as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians. Senator
McGovern also reported that any discussions with Arafat and the PLO
need not imply formal recognition of the PLO or any Palestinian organiza.
tion. He also supported Hussein's proposal for an interim UN regime
on the West Bank and in Gaza, to be followed by a permanent arrange-
ment which would be chosen by the Palestinians through a UN prebiscite.
He also urged the United States government to declare that it will recog-
nize Palestinian self-determination as part of a general settlement.
On the issue of borders Senator McGovern said that practical modi-
fications could be worked out if the parties would agree, contingent on
the negotiations of a general settlement, to accept Israel's existence
and normalize relations and to recognize Palestinian self-determination
in the West Bank and Gaza. The most difficult problem would be to
50
settle the status of Jerusalem.
As was stated, Senator McGovern's report did not become an offi-
cial policy of the United States government. However, it is important
in that it does give indications of future US policies and positions con-
cerning the Palestinians.
On 12 November 1975 Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, testified
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maintained without their consent and that they are entitled to be heard
and to the same principle of self-determination that others treasure.
In his conclusions he defined the interests of the United States in
the area. He stated that the US has a clear interest and moral obliga-
tion to the survival and security of Israel. Israel, according to the
statement, must not be allowed to disappear, and the Arabs must come
to the full awareness that the US commitment to Israel's survival and
security is permanent. He also indicated that since the Arabs and
Israelis live in the same region, any settlement must be negotiated by
them and not be imposed upon them against their will. In his remarks
he included the capability of the economic capacity of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip to sustain all Palestinians who wish to reside there.
He stated that the US must be ready to assist the economics of this area.
The United States should also consider offering aid to Palestinian ref-
ugees and Arab governments for the purpose of permanently settling
those Palestinians who choose to remain in Arab states.
On reciprocal recognition, the report stated that the Arabs must
recognize that there is a Jewish state of Israel. It went on to say that
neither Israel or the US should or can designate the PLO as the present
representative or future government of the Palestinian people. This is
a point for the Palestinians to decide, and an imposed decision from
outside would deny the principle of self-determination. It also stated
that, at the same time, could anyone else, such as King Hussein, be
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PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He
then stated that the PLO does not recognize resolutions 242 and 338, nor
did it recognize the existence of Israel. Because of this, he said, the US
did not have a framework for negotiations in which the PLO would take
part.
Concerning a solution to the dilemma, Saunders specified that there
was no American solution for finding a way by which the Palestinians can
be included in negotiations. He then added that the US had not closed its
mind to any reasonable settlement.
The Saunders Document did not constitute a change in the policy of
the US towards the PLO. It neither recognized the PLO nor the fact that
it constituted the accepted sole negotiator on behalf of the Palestinians.
However, by presenting, for the first time, the fact that a settlement of
the Palestinian problem is essential and basic for the success of the
peace process, it did indicate that the United States government had
51
developed a Palestinian policy.
Israeli and Arab reaction to the Saunders Document was immediate.
Although Kissinger assured the Israeli government that there had been
no change in the position of the US concerning the PLO, the Israeli
government issued a statement in which it criticized the document,
describing it as biased and containing many mistakes. The government
then asked the US for clarifications and said it was not satisfied with the
assurances of Kissinger. What worried the Israelis most about the
^l"The Palestinian Issue, " The Department of State Current Policy,
pp. 1-3, November 1975.
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document was that it considered the Palestinians to be a political factor,
essential for the peace process and it considered the PLO as a possible
negotiator if certain conditions were met. Israel maintained its policy
that a settlement of the dispute must be found by states of the area and
that the problem of the Palestinians should be solved within the Jordanian-
Israeli framework. The government then stated it was concerned that
the document considered the Arabs living within the pre- 1967 borders of
Israel to be Palestinians.
The Arabs and Palestinians reacted to the document by stating it
was a statement of flowery words, void of meaning or commitment.
They said Saunders' statement just repeated an old American cliche
about the need to give consideration to the Palestinian people's interests.
They accused the document of stopping at the usual barrier, arguing
that the problem is that the PLO does not recognize Israel, and there-
fore, the United States could not talk to the PLO or recognize it. The
Palestinians called it the same US -Israeli game with Israel's feigning
anger at the document. In this, the Palestinians referenced Rabin's
statement in 1974 in which he said that the state of Israel would not
negotiate with terrorist organizations whose sole objective is the
destruction of Israel. Both the Arabs and Palestinians then called for
a viable US policy which recognized the PLO as the spokesman for
the Palestinians. The main thrust of their arguments was the reference
to resolutions 242 and 338 which the PLO refuses to recognize.
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In addition to McGovern's visit to the Middle East, the year 1975
saw many other unofficial visits to the area. In May Arafat briefed
Senator Howard Baker, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, on the Palestinian position. Baker, on his return to the US,
stressed the necessity of establishing a Palestinian entity. In June
Senator William Fulbright met with Arafat. After these discussions
Fulbright emphasized that the Palestinians are a main party to the dis-
pute and should be invited to the Geneva Conference. He expressed his
hopes of a legal text which would secure a special entity for the Pales-
tinian people and urged the US to recognize the PLO. At the end of the
year a group of 25 Americans, including university professors and
former officials, sent a message to President Ford. In this message
they urged Ford to begin exploratory talks with the PLO in order to
establish a basis for the PLC's participation in peace talks. Arab dip-
lomatic sources reported there had been contacts between the US and
the PLO at the lower level. These diplomats expressed their beliefs
that because the contacts were at this level, the US was still hesitant
to commit itself to any higher level meeting with the PLO to discuss its
role in the peace process.
The year of 1976 was an election year for the US, and the Pales-
tinian problem was still in evidence. In July, during the civil war in
Lebanon, US Embassy Officials in Beirut stated the US had had direct
contacts with the PLO concerning the US evacuation of foreign nationals
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from Lebanon. An Embassy official admitted this was not the first
contact with the PLO, because the US had been in contact with the PLO
for some time to ensure the safety of the embassy and its staff. The
spokesman also stated the PLO had been contacted at the end of June
with the aim of discovering the assassins of US Ambassador Francis
Meloy, Jr. and his counsellor, Robert Waring. President Ford thanked
all who had helped with the evacuation, and a State Department spokes-
man later affirmed this included the PLO. The State Department then
issued an affirmation to the Israeli government that the contacts with
the PLO were strictly on security matters, and the US would not
recognize the PLO as a negotiating partner as long as the PLO refused
to recognize Israel's right to exist.
On 25 July Jimmy Carter, Democratic Party presidential nominee,
stated that if he were elected, his commitment to Israel would be un-
equivocable and that the US would provide them with adequate military
and economic aid so that they can defend themselves. He then said that
the Palestinians should be recognized and that Israel should cede major
portions of occupied territory. He went on to say, "I think the Pales
-
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tinians should be part of Jordan and be administered by Jordan. '
On 6 October the US presidential candidates, President Ford and
Jimmy Carter, gave their views on the Middle East. Carter came out





strongly against the Arabs and accused Ford's administration of making
Israel the scapegoat in the October 1973 war. He also recalled the US
threat of reassessment of its policy on Israel; he then criticized the
failure of Ford's administration to combat the Arab boycott. President
Ford, in his reply, stated his administration had not neglected its com-
mitment to Israel and gave figures of US arms shipments to Israel. He
then reaffirmed the US commitment to the state of Israel; he also pledged
there would be no imposed solutions and there would be no one-sided
concessions.
D. JANUARY 1977 --
After assuming the office of President in January, Carter set up
meetings with leaders from Israel, Egypt, and Syria. In speaking with
the Israeli official, Carter promised the US would support the right of
Israel to have what he termed 'defensible borders. ' He also spoke with
the Arab leaders about peace in the Middle East, and he indicated that
the Palestinians and the PLO should be recognized.
In the meantime, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, conducted a tour
of the Middle East in February to discuss views on a Middle East
Settlement. Vance emphasized his tour was a quest for peace with the
emphasis on an over-all settlement rather than limited agreements. He
reiterated the US was deeply committed to the security and survival of
Israel and its values.
118

Presently, the position of the US is that the state of Israel must
continue to exist; however, according to this position, Israel should
withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza to allow the establishment of a
Palestinian state. In view of this position, all sides seem to have taken
a wait-and-see attitude to determine if this is the final stand of the
United States.
E. ISRAELI POSITION
In discussing this issue, it is difficult for anyone to obtain a secure
feeling as to what the Israeli position is or might be. This is because
the issue is a matter of politics on the part of both the Israelis and
Palestinians.
The Israeli government, in its official statements, has consist-
ently refused to recognize the PLO because of its charter. Recent
international events have stirred some apparent softening on Israel's
position. However, the 1977 elections in Israel may have negated this
trend. Two events forced Israel to make more statements on the PLO
than it had before (as regarding statehood): the Rabat Summit which
recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians, and the
recognition of the PLO by the United Nations. Another problem for
the Israelis is that theirs is a coalition government, made up of many
political parties. These parties often have different viewpoints.
In an interview on 3 November 1974 Arafat stated it was his under-
standing that the majority of the Israeli Knesset members were against
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any withdrawal from the West Bank. He went on to say that there was
no use in establishing a Palestinian government, because such a govern-
ment could not be established until definite interests had been specified.
Israeli Prmier Rabin replied to this interview on 5 November by stating
that Israel would never negotiate with the PLO and said the Rabat deci-
sions assigned an organization of murderers to establish a Palestinian
state. He went on to say Israel would never agree to negotiate with an
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organization of terrorists.
In 1975 a Palestinian spokesman indicated the possibility of a
Palestinian state. This would be practical if the Palestinians could
gain sovereignty over part of their land. The spokesman indicated this
territory would be a base for continuing the struggle to establish the
legitimate rights of the Palestinians in accordance with United Nations
resolutions. Israel immediately rejected this statement. Both sides
continued to issue such statements, the Arabs calling for the establish-
ment of a democratic secular state, and the Israelis rejecting each plan.
At the same time, the Palestinians rejected each Israeli proposal, such
as a Jordanian-Palestinian federation.
In 1976 there appeared to be a move by the PLO to modify its
position. Farouq Qaddoumi in 15 November expressed support for a
plan for the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity in the





West Bank and Gaza. This was in response to UN Palestinian Rights
Committee plan. Another PLO spokesman, Nabil Shaath of the PLO
Planning Committee, reported that some Palestinians, including Fatah,
were willing to discuss a change of tactics which would end attacks
against Israel and explore the chances of an Arab-Israeli coexistence.
The 'rejection front 1 responded to this by stating it would never stop
its actions against Israel. Rabin responded by saying Israel preferred
direct talks but was ready for contacts in any form which would lead to
a change in the Middle East reality and to the building of a system of
peaceful relations. He went on to say that Israel did not believe that
the question of Palestine could be solved by the creation of a state in
the occupied territories. He termed such a state as a time bomb at
the door of Israel.
Rabin seemed to soften his stand in a later interview. These
remarks included the fact that Israel would study any Palestinian pro-
posal of recognition if the PLO recognized Israel. He stressed any
such a change of policy by the PLO would have to include abandonment
of the PLO National Charter which calls for a secular state to replace
Israel. These remarks were a step back from other Rabin interviews
in which he said Israel would never deal with the PLO even if it gave
up the secular state idea.
One difficulty for the Israeli government in establishing a Pales-
tinian policy had been proposals by individuals and groups both in and
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out of the government. One of the first of these was the Allon Plan of
the Israeli Deputy Prmier, Yigal Allon. This plan, first put forward
in 1967, was never officially adopted by the government. Allon sug-
gested Israeli withdrawal from 65 percent of the West Bank except for
an eight-mile wide security belt along the Jordan Valley. This area
included 12 Israeli settlements and included some areas near Jerusalem.
The remainder of the West Bank would revert to Arab rule. A corridor
would run from near Jerusalem through Jericho to Jordan and would
link the West Bank in a federation with Jordan. In this plan Allon said
Israel would keep the fertile flat land running down to the Jordan River,
the mountain range above the flat land, and the Judean desert beginning
near Jerusalem. Land settled by Jews would be considered sovereign
Israeli land and therefore Israel had to be careful and selective in
choosing settlement sites so that it did not uproot Arab farmers or
cause political obstacles or complicate the peace negotiations which
may come.
In another statement Major General Ariel Sharon, who led the
Israelis in crossing the Suez Canal in October 1973, announced on
2 3 December 1974 that the establishment of a Palestinian state to
replace the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was inevitable. He suggested
the new state should be linked to Israel, either by coalition or federa-
tion. However, he was opposed to Israeli withdrawal from the West
Bank and indicated Israel should oppose the return of any Palestinian
refugees in Arab countries, except to reunify split families.
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In December 1974 the Secretary General of the Israeli Mapam
Party, Naftali Fader, admitted meeting a PLO official in Paris.
Fader termed the meeting as casual, and no statement was given by
either party. The Israeli Government announced earlier that no
Israeli-PLO meeting had taken place.
The Israel Council for Israeli- Palestinian Peace was established
on 10 December 1975. In February 1976 it issued a 12 point statement
which contained their aims, beliefs, and objectives. Included in this
statement were the following points. (1) This land is the homeland of
its two peoples -- the people of Israel and the Palestinian Arab people.
(2) The only path to peace is through co-existence between two sover-
eign states, each with its distinct national identity; the state of Israel
for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian Arab people.
(3) The establishment of a Palestinian Arab state alongside the State of
Israel should be the outcome of negotiations between the Government
of Israel and a recognized and authoritative representative body of
the Palestinian Arab people, without refusing negotiation with the
54
Palestine Liberation Organization, on the basis of mutual recognition.
On 16 September 1976 Allon proposed a new plan for Israeli
withdrawal from occupied territories. The plan included Israeli
withdrawal from the West Bank, to enable it to become a single
54
"Declaration of the Israel Council for Israeli-Palestinian
Peace, " SWASIA, p. 3, 6 February 1976.
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Jordanian- Palestinian state. It also called for the withdrawal from
Gaza City, which would become the port for the new state. These areas
would become demilitarized zones. According to the plan, almost all
of the Arab population of the occupied territories would come under
Arab rule and this would solve the problem of Palestinian identity. The
plan would allow Israel to keep part of the occupied territory to permit
it to have an essential minimum of strategic depth for security. Allon
said precise boundaries could be fixed in negotiations with Arab states.
In Israel the question of the legality of Israelis meeting with
Palestinians without the sanction of the government. On 10 November
1976 the Israeli Justice Minister, Haim Zadok, rejected a demand by
the Likud Bloc for action against several Israelis who had made con-
tacts with the PLO representatives. In what was described as a signif-
icant softening of the Israeli line, Zadok gave the legal opinion that,
although the contacts were politically objectionable because they were
not consistent with the government's unconditional opposition to negotia-
tions with the PLO, they were legally permissible so long as they did
not violate state security abroad.
The question for Israel is whether or not to recognize the PLO.
There did seem to be some softening of the official Israeli policy before
1977 as was evidenced by Zadok's legal opinion and the Sinai Agreement
negotiated between Israel and Egypt in September 1975. In this agree-
ment the US pledged to refuse recognition of the PLO so long as the
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PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. This agreement strengthened
Israel's position and received denouncement from some Arab states and
all Palestinian groups.
The Israeli voters in 1977 elected the Likud Party to power and
increased its number of seats in the Knesset. This party is one of
the right-wing parties in Israel, and after the election the leaders of
the party reaffirmed its refusal to recognize the PLO. The position of
the Palestinians and the Arab states had been to wait until the forma-
tion of a coalition government before they come to any firm conclusions




Proposed solutions to the Palestinian problem are as numerous
and varied as the interests of the parties involved. Because of these
interests it is hardly surprising that none of the major proposals has
been acceptable to all parties. The problem which faces any proposal
for recognition is the quality of nationalism; two nationalisms which
meet head-on in the struggle for what is known as Palestine. This
one land, two people.
The Israelis maintain they have historic rights in Palestine because
their forefathers conquered the land in the days of Joshua and King
David, and, according to the Torah, God had promised them this land.
The Arabs point out their ancestors lived in this land, long before the
Jews arrived, and that Arab tribes have occupied the land continuously
for thirteen centuries since the Arab conflict.
These proposals offered in this thesis are based on the hypothesis
that the United States will recognize the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion if the Palestinians gain a state of their own.
A. A PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA
This is probably the most-publicized proposal for an independent
state for the Palestinians. The PLO has recently made statements
which indicate they are favorable to this solution to their problem. The
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Soviet Union and the Arab States now support the idea of creating a
separate Palestinian state in territory now occupied by Israel. The
important fact for the US is that under the Carter administration, this
proposal has been stated as the position of this administration
Israel has opposed the proposal on the ground that radical Pales-
tinians would control any such state and use it as a base from which to
work for Israel's destruction. There are political reasons for opposi-
tion to this proposal in Israel, in addition to the security problem
which a Palestinian state could create. Religious and conservative
groups probably would bring about the downfall of any Israeli govern-
ment that advocated giving up Israeli-held land to the Palestinians.
This actuality was brought in focus in 1977 when the right-wing Likud
Party won the elections in Israel on the basis the Labor Party was
becoming moderate in_its thinking concerning the West Bank and the
establishment of 'illegal' settlements in the West Bank.
For the United States, Israel, and Jordan a Palestinian state on
the West Bank and in Gaza qould pose innumerable difficulties and pos-
sible dangers. For any US administration there is the fear that such
a state might turn to the Soviet Union for military and political support.
This fear might be well-founded since the PLO representatives and
other Fedayeen members have made several trips to the Soviet Union.
The Israelis are aware that even if PLO leaders were denied any
significant voice in the Palestinian government, there would be pressure
on any government to seize more of the territory from Israel.
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Parallelling the Israeli viewpoint, Jordan would not welcome the
creation of a state in this area. Although Hussein reluctantly agreed
to the Rabat Summit's decision, some observers believe he expected
the PLO to fail in its aim, giving him opportunities to reassert his
claims to the West Bank. Although there has been some reconciliation
between Jordan and the PLO, there is still the fact that many of the
Fedayeen believe Hussein is a detriment to the Palestinian cause and
advocate his overthrow or death.
Not all Arab leaders regard the establishment of a Palestinian
state on the West Bank as practical. Tunisian Foreign Minister Hahib
Chatti was quoted in The Washington Star-News
, p. 10, 24 March 1974,
when he stated: "The only workable solution to the Palestinian problem,
and one which we are sure their leaders would accept, is the creation
of a new Palestinian state. But the West Bank of the Jordan River and
the Gaza Strip would not suffice for such a state. The Palestinians
would need more than these overcrowded bits of territories and that
additional land would have to come from Israel and Jordan. "
B. PALESTINIAN- JORDANIAN FEDERATION
In 1972 Hussein proposed to the Jordanian Parliament a restructur-
ing of the country into a federal state. This state would be made up of
two autonomous regions, Transjordan and the Israeli-occupied West
Bank, and each region would have equal representation in the national
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parliament in Amman. The central government would be responsible for
defense, foreign affairs, and other matters of purely national interests.
Hussein implied that residents of the Gaza Strip could freely join the
new state which would be called the United Arab Kingdom. There was
immediate reaction to this proposal by both the Israelis and Palestinians.
Israel was cool to the suggestion, and it was denounced by the PLO and
55Fedayeen groups as a sellout.
This was a move by Jordan to regain at least a part of the West
Bank and a plebiscite by its inhabitants. Some observers had the
opinion that the West Bank Arabs would opt for a separate non-PLO
type of state with close ties to both Jordan and Israel. This was based
on the fact that the West Bank had an economic structure which sup-
ported itself, a structure better than that of the other Palestinians.
The most difficult and emotional issue to be solved in such a
proposal would be the fate of Jerusalem, a holy city to the Israelis,
Moslems, and Christians. Israeli leaders have repeatedly and insist-
ently declared that Jerusalem is not negotiable. In this light, it is
unlikely that the devout Moslem leaders would accede to any overall
peace settlement which did not provide for at least shared control of
this city.
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Such a proposal as this, bringing more Palestinians under the
Jordanian rule, would present dangers to Hussein and Israel. The
population of Jordan is already made up of a large number of Pales-
tinians, and the addition of those on the West Bank and Gaza would
increase pressures for the replacement of the Hashemite Kingdom by
a Palestinian state. A Palestinian state such as this would bring little
peace to the security-minded Israelis who insist on a neutral zone to
prevent or inhibit terrorists from entering Israel. There is also the
fact that a movement exists in Israel not to cede any land which it has
gained from the past Israeli-Arab wars.
C. SECULAR DEMOCRACY
Visionaries on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian debate have
often expressed the view that the ideal solution to this problem would
be the establishment of a secular, democratic state where Jews, Moslems,
and Christians could coexist peacefully. Recently, some Palestinians,
including most PLO leaders, have attempted to draw a distinction
between Jews and Zionists by insisting Palestinians and Jews have lived
and can again live in friendship once the 'exclusivist, discriminatory,
imperialist Zionist state' is abolished. Israelis who are sympathetic
to such a state have urged the PLO to amend their Palestinian National
Covenant to permit all Jews, regardless of their immigration dates,
to remain in the new state if established. Some of these Israelis have
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offered resolutions to the Knesset for the creation of a Palestinian
state and a federation between Israel and the new state. According to
this proposal, it would put an end to mutual fear and suspicion and
would permit a peaceful pooling of political power and economic
resources.
The reaction to such a proposal had been predictable. For Israel
it would mean an end to its existence as a separate nation for Jews.
Few Israelis would be willing to give up its existence for an assimilation
into one people with the Palestinians. Most of the Fedayeen groups
would be unwilling to have a state comprised of all groups since they,
with some exceptions, insist that all provisions of their covenant be
maintained.
D. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
Before the dream of a recognized, separate Palestinian state is
fulfilled, there must be a look at how it would affect other nations.
Israel feels that the territorial concessions it is asked to make are
unfair in the light of its military successes in past wars. They insist
that Israel continues to maintain its existence, with or without support
from others. There are two schools of thought in Israel. There are
those who believe Israel must and can prevail by superior strength.
On the other side, there are those who have come to the conclusion
that the great lesson to be drawn from history is not that Israel must
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have more space in which it can defend itself but that this is a last
chance to come to terms with the Arabs.
In the United States there is also a division of thought on the
subject. The energy crisis of 1973 made many Americans aware of the
extent of the cost of support this country bears for the sake of Israel.
Inevitably, some Americans will turn against Israel and will insist on
closer relations, regardless of the cost to Israel, with Arab nations to
avoid another energy crisis.
For the Arabs there is a real danger in any kind of proposal for a
settlement of this problem. If there is a settlement, the strength of
the moderates will be consolidated and a period of stability in the area
will follow. If there is no settlement, there will be no consolidation, no
stability, no peace. In any case the moderates in the Arab World will
find themselves under more pressure by the radical forces. These
leaders, such as Sadat and Hussein, will be accused of being 'lackeys'
of the United States. Hussein will be accused of wiping out the Fedayeen
and Sadat will be castigated for having expelled the Soviets, depriving
the Arabs of the military backing they need to match the power of
Israel.
Any kind of settlement poses difficulties for the Fedayeen. Fatah
will probably disappear or become captive of the moderate regimes in
the Arab world. While this is occurring, the radicals in Fatah, the
'rejection front', and the other groups will go underground. They will
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undertake the mission to overthrow the monarchies, then the moderate
republics, and finally the 'liberated regimes. ' In every Arab state
these groups will have a fifth column working for them. For the PLO
there is the problem of keeping its aspirations in the limelight. If they
are recognized and become an independent state, they will have the
problem of support. On what nations can they depend to give them the
military and economic aid needed to maintain their independence. If
there is no separate state for the Palestinians, the problem for the
PLO will be the apathy to its cause by other nations. There is already
indications that these nations, particularly the Third World, are becom-
ing less concerned with the Palestinians and more concerned with their
own needs.
The problem of the Palestinians is real. Because they are home-
less, because they have aspirations and are frustrated, and because
they find little solace to their problems, the Palestinians are in the
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